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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 75 …In the North Pacific only the narrow Bering Strait separated Siberia from Alaska, and farther south…
  • p. 242 …O R+ POI NT HAWAIIAN I SLA PACIFIC OCEAN 196 o w s U I DS
  • p. 322 …any one of many points in both oceans and along our coast lines and against the…
  • p. 332 …The shots seemed designed to punctuate the President’s statement that “the broad oceans which have…
  • p. 387 …Another Indian Ocean route was proposed that would have connected Mombasa with Ceylon or Bangalore, India…
  • p. 480 …Nimitz as commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Area, whose responsibilities included the maintenance of…
  • p. 489 …Defense of the South Pacific Route It has been indicated elsewhere that the fear of just…
  • p. 515 …Chester Nimitz, commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Area, could not know of the debates…
  • p. 537 …Pacific Ocean,’ but the division of command between the Army and Navy in the Pacific naturally…
  • p. 630 …T h e United States was asked to provide additional air strength for the Pacific, to…
  • p. 775 …Transport Cornand‘s Ocean Ferry (London, 1945), pp. 5-19; Summary of Information covering the organization…
  • p. 791 …ON1 Combat Narratives, Early Raids in the Pacific Ocean, I Feb.-ro Mar. 1942; RAAF Intel…
  • p. 797 …This action was to be co-ordinated with an operation in the South Pacific against Tulagi…
  • p. 833 …Headquarters, VIII Bomber Command, High Wycombe Prime Minister Pacific Ocean Area New Caledonia Task Force Plan…
  • p. 850 …336407 3537 356, 3803 395-96, q857 496 India-China Ferry, organization, 508 Indian Ocean, 33…
  • p. 856 …I , 432, 477 Pacific Fleet (US.), 137, 19697, 236, 272-73 Pacific Ocean Area, 419, 452…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
in Greenland by this time, and two companies of aviation engineers
were hurriedly constructing the facilities necessary for air defense of
G~eenland.’~
American defense preparations in Iceland were accorded a degree
of urgency not given to those in Greenland, even though more than
2 5 , 0 0 0 British troops were protecting the island. On 5 July 1941
President Roosevelt, in oral orders to the Army Chief of Staff and the
Chief of Naval Operations, directed that one Army pursuit squadron
with the necessary maintenance and administrative detachments be
sent to Iceland as soon as practicable. The 33d Pursuit Squadron was
immediately prepared for shipment, and on 2 5 July the air echelon,
with thirty p-40’~and three primary training planes, boarded the
carrier W a s p a t Norfolk, Virginia. T w o days later an air base squad-
ron sailed from New York for Iceland, and American planes shortly
were operating from the Reykjavik airdrome in southwestern Iceland.
The air service contingent was augmented in November by 2 I officers
and 336 enlisted men from the First Air Force, comprising ordnance,
weather, aircraft warning, and materiel units.” American ground
forces were also arriving in Iceland, but complete relief of British
forces was not expected to be accomplished before May 1942; until
that time the defense of Iceland was the joint responsibility of all air,
ground, and naval forces stationed there.
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in December 1941,American
forces in Iceland were operating under orders which stipulated that
the approach of any Axis forces to within fifty miles of the island
would be deemed “conclusive evidence of hostile intent” and would
justify attack by the American defenders. The mission of Army avia-
tion, operating under the Iceland Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and naval forces in offensive and defensive operations, aerial recon-
naissance and photographic operations, and transportation of supplies
and personnel. The 33d Pursuit Squadron was of course incapable of
carrying out all phases of the mission, and plans were being made for
shipment of a bombardment squadron, an observation squadron, and
an additional pursuit squadron.“
Reinforcement was delayed both by the shortage of trained squad-
rons in the United States and by the lack of proper aviation facilities
in Iceland. British forces had prepared two airfields for limited opera-
tions and had formed a coastal observation network of thirty-nine
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.