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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
in Greenland by this time, and two companies of aviation engineers
were hurriedly constructing the facilities necessary for air defense of
G~eenland.’~
American defense preparations in Iceland were accorded a degree
of urgency not given to those in Greenland, even though more than
2 5 , 0 0 0 British troops were protecting the island. On 5 July 1941
President Roosevelt, in oral orders to the Army Chief of Staff and the
Chief of Naval Operations, directed that one Army pursuit squadron
with the necessary maintenance and administrative detachments be
sent to Iceland as soon as practicable. The 33d Pursuit Squadron was
immediately prepared for shipment, and on 2 5 July the air echelon,
with thirty p-40’~and three primary training planes, boarded the
carrier W a s p a t Norfolk, Virginia. T w o days later an air base squad-
ron sailed from New York for Iceland, and American planes shortly
were operating from the Reykjavik airdrome in southwestern Iceland.
The air service contingent was augmented in November by 2 I officers
and 336 enlisted men from the First Air Force, comprising ordnance,
weather, aircraft warning, and materiel units.” American ground
forces were also arriving in Iceland, but complete relief of British
forces was not expected to be accomplished before May 1942; until
that time the defense of Iceland was the joint responsibility of all air,
ground, and naval forces stationed there.
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in December 1941,American
forces in Iceland were operating under orders which stipulated that
the approach of any Axis forces to within fifty miles of the island
would be deemed “conclusive evidence of hostile intent” and would
justify attack by the American defenders. The mission of Army avia-
tion, operating under the Iceland Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and naval forces in offensive and defensive operations, aerial recon-
naissance and photographic operations, and transportation of supplies
and personnel. The 33d Pursuit Squadron was of course incapable of
carrying out all phases of the mission, and plans were being made for
shipment of a bombardment squadron, an observation squadron, and
an additional pursuit squadron.“
Reinforcement was delayed both by the shortage of trained squad-
rons in the United States and by the lack of proper aviation facilities
in Iceland. British forces had prepared two airfields for limited opera-
tions and had formed a coastal observation network of thirty-nine
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