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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 in Greenland by this time, and two companies of aviation engineers were hurriedly constructing the facilities necessary for air defense of G~eenland.’~ American defense preparations in Iceland were accorded a degree of urgency not given to those in Greenland, even though more than 2 5 , 0 0 0 British troops were protecting the island. On 5 July 1941 President Roosevelt, in oral orders to the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, directed that one Army pursuit squadron with the necessary maintenance and administrative detachments be sent to Iceland as soon as practicable. The 33d Pursuit Squadron was immediately prepared for shipment, and on 2 5 July the air echelon, with thirty p-40’~and three primary training planes, boarded the carrier W a s p a t Norfolk, Virginia. T w o days later an air base squad- ron sailed from New York for Iceland, and American planes shortly were operating from the Reykjavik airdrome in southwestern Iceland. The air service contingent was augmented in November by 2 I officers and 336 enlisted men from the First Air Force, comprising ordnance, weather, aircraft warning, and materiel units.” American ground forces were also arriving in Iceland, but complete relief of British forces was not expected to be accomplished before May 1942; until that time the defense of Iceland was the joint responsibility of all air, ground, and naval forces stationed there. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in December 1941,American forces in Iceland were operating under orders which stipulated that the approach of any Axis forces to within fifty miles of the island would be deemed “conclusive evidence of hostile intent” and would justify attack by the American defenders. The mission of Army avia- tion, operating under the Iceland Base commander, included inde- pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land and naval forces in offensive and defensive operations, aerial recon- naissance and photographic operations, and transportation of supplies and personnel. The 33d Pursuit Squadron was of course incapable of carrying out all phases of the mission, and plans were being made for shipment of a bombardment squadron, an observation squadron, and an additional pursuit squadron.“ Reinforcement was delayed both by the shortage of trained squad- rons in the United States and by the lack of proper aviation facilities in Iceland. British forces had prepared two airfields for limited opera- tions and had formed a coastal observation network of thirty-nine I 58
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