“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
F O R E W O R D
ters, ATC. Capt. Alfred Goldberg, after working on the histories
of the VIII Air Force Service Command and Air Service Command,
USSTAF, was assigned to Headquarters, USSTAF.
Finally there remains something to be told about the history itself.
T h e title is descriptive of its scope. It is not a complete history of the
Army air arm, since it covers in detail only a four-year period. Nor
is it a complete history of those war years, since it deals as exclusively
as possible with activities of the AAF. This is through no childish
fancy that the AAF won the war single-handed. Victory was possible
only through the combined efforts of the several arms of the associated
powers and of the civilians behind those arms. But to tell the story of
the AAF’s share in the air war is itself a heavy assignment, and the
authors have dealt with the operations of other services and nations
only as they impinged directly upon those of the Army Air Forces.
This volume constitutes, according to present plans, the first of
seven. It deals first with the Army air arm before 7 December 1941
and more intensively with its fortunes during the first eight or ten
months of the war. For that period of defeat, retreat, small-scale oper-
ations, and frenzied preparation, it has been found convenient to
describe under a single cover AAF activities in every theater. With
the beginning of the offensive in late 1942, limited at first but swelling
in intensity as men and material were made available, the story becomes
in effect that of two large-scale wars waged simultaneously, intimately
connected by highest strategy and the allocation of forces but tac-
tically independent. Hence it has been thought best to avoid a strictly
chronological account, treating the air war against Germany and Italy
in Volumes I1 and 111, against Japan in I V and V. Throughout, an
effort has been made t3 relate operations in the several theaters through
discussion of pertinent strategical and logistical plans developed by
the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. Similarly, problems of the
Zone of the Interior-organization, production, training, transporta-
tion, and the like-have been treated briefly wherever necessary for an
understanding of combat operations. But these problems have seemed
so important-indeed to the degree that one may find the main clue to
our victory in American manpower and production-that the whole
of Volume VI will be devoted to activities on the home front. T h e
final volume will include an account of the world-wide services of the
Army Air Forces, such as the Air Transport Command and Army Air-
ways Communications System, and of the handling of problems which
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