“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
program utilizing duplicate bombardment crews for the other types
should be initiated in 1943. For protection of the air bases, 10 pursuit
groups were to be located in the United Kingdom, 6 in the Near East.
To avoid overcongestion in those areas, the 4,000-mile-radius planes,
when available, would be based elsewhere, as in Newfoundland,
Greenland, Africa, or India.
T h e success of the whole program was predicated upon the ability
of American bombers to conduct daylight missions far into Europe.
In spite of earlier German and English experience, it was concluded
that “by employing large numbers of aircraft with high speed, good
defensive fire power, and high altitude,” it would be feasible to make
deep penetrations into Germany by day. But to guard against expected
improvements in German fighter defense, it was suggested that experi-
ments be begun immediately to develop a heavily armed and armored
escort fighter with long-range
T h e planners considered it improbable that a large-scale invasion of
Europe could be made before spring of 1944, which would coincide
with the climax of the bomber attack, and they believed that “if the
air offensive is successful, a land offensive may not be necessary.”
Complete victory through air power alone, however, could not be
assured, and provision was made for close support of ground forces in
that assault. T h e tactical air force should include 13 groups each of
light bombers (A-zo) and dive bombers, z photo reconnaissance
groups, I 08 observation squadrons, and 19 transport groups.’46Pursuit
units would include 5 groups set up as reserve for the British Isles and
such of the interceptor units there as might be spared.
Separate provisions were included for aircraft for training and for
the transport of air materie1.l4’ Estimates were made for the require-
ment in pilots (103,482) and in total personnel (2,164,916),~~*and
some general statements were given as to the methods of training.
T h e President in his directive had stated that he was “not suggesting
a detailed report,” but the air planners had, in effect, drawn up a
blueprint for the approaching war. From the vantage point of the
present it is easy to find flaws in this plan. Actual experience in the
war showed that the forces allocated for strategic defense in the Pa-
cific were inadequate, those for hemisphere defense too abundant. T h e
qualified faith in the ability of air power alone to conquer Germany
proved ungrounded, and the force scheduled for support of the inva-
sion was weak in fighters. But viewed solely as a program for the
‘49