Documents / Document
This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1 program utilizing duplicate bombardment crews for the other types should be initiated in 1943. For protection of the air bases, 10 pursuit groups were to be located in the United Kingdom, 6 in the Near East. To avoid overcongestion in those areas, the 4,000-mile-radius planes, when available, would be based elsewhere, as in Newfoundland, Greenland, Africa, or India. T h e success of the whole program was predicated upon the ability of American bombers to conduct daylight missions far into Europe. In spite of earlier German and English experience, it was concluded that “by employing large numbers of aircraft with high speed, good defensive fire power, and high altitude,” it would be feasible to make deep penetrations into Germany by day. But to guard against expected improvements in German fighter defense, it was suggested that experi- ments be begun immediately to develop a heavily armed and armored escort fighter with long-range T h e planners considered it improbable that a large-scale invasion of Europe could be made before spring of 1944, which would coincide with the climax of the bomber attack, and they believed that “if the air offensive is successful, a land offensive may not be necessary.” Complete victory through air power alone, however, could not be assured, and provision was made for close support of ground forces in that assault. T h e tactical air force should include 13 groups each of light bombers (A-zo) and dive bombers, z photo reconnaissance groups, I 08 observation squadrons, and 19 transport groups.’46Pursuit units would include 5 groups set up as reserve for the British Isles and such of the interceptor units there as might be spared. Separate provisions were included for aircraft for training and for the transport of air materie1.l4’ Estimates were made for the require- ment in pilots (103,482) and in total personnel (2,164,916),~~*and some general statements were given as to the methods of training. T h e President in his directive had stated that he was “not suggesting a detailed report,” but the air planners had, in effect, drawn up a blueprint for the approaching war. From the vantage point of the present it is easy to find flaws in this plan. Actual experience in the war showed that the forces allocated for strategic defense in the Pa- cific were inadequate, those for hemisphere defense too abundant. T h e qualified faith in the ability of air power alone to conquer Germany proved ungrounded, and the force scheduled for support of the inva- sion was weak in fighters. But viewed solely as a program for the ‘49
Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.