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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“United Press”36 pages
T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A K , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1 AAF staff had assumed on this occasion a position of equality with those of the older arms. T h e air planners, in framing AWPD/r, explicitly accepted the general principles of ABC-I and the specific allocation of tasks in RAINBOW No. 5. Under these guides the Army air mission was conceived as entailing three tasks: to conduct air operations in defense of the Western Hemisphere; to assist in the strategic defense in the Pacific; and to wage an unremitting air offensive against Germany and lands occupied by its forces-including, if necessary, the support of a final invasion of the continent. T h e time schedule was somewhat complicated. T h e war was viewed as consisting of three phases: ( I ) the period until M-day, characterized by rapid expansion of forces and production, while measures short of war were being continued; ( 2 ) M-day until completion of preparations, characterized by a strategic defensive against Japan and a mounting weight of attack against Germany; and ( 3 ) the all-out attack on Europe. It was assumed that the air offensive in Europe could be initiated in April I 942, but that productive capacity and training would not support the all-out offensive until April 1944. Consequently allocation of air units was calculated in terms of an interim program and of an ulti- mate force which included aircraft models as yet in the early experi- mental stage.l4' T o furnish air defense for the Western Hemisphere and for our overseas possessions, a force of twenty-three bombardment and thirty- one pursuit groups (each of the latter including three day and one night interceptor squadrons) was planned. These forces were desig- nated for specific bases in the continental United States; in the Philippines, Hawaii, and Alaska; and in South America, the Carib- bean, the Canal Zone, and the northeast area of North America. O n the assumption that the air offensive against Germany would mini- mize danger of an attack from that direction, these forces were in general oriented toward Japan, and provision was made to transfer six pursuit groups to Europe for the final 0 f f e n ~ i v e . l ~ ~ It is obvious that aircraft based in Alaska, Hawaii, and even on the West Coast would contribute toward the strategic defensive against Japan, and that beyond that the major responsibility would fall to the Navy. But because of the importance of the Philippines in light of the stiffening of U.S. policies in the Far East, it was proposed to add to the air forces in those islands one pursuit and two heavy '47
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