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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 5 …Imprint N March 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to the Director of the Bureau of…
  • p. 138 …1939-4I N 28 January 1938 President Roosevelt declared our national defenses inadequate in the face…
  • p. 141 …changed our requirements for defensive aviation,” President Roosevelt strongly urged that $300,- ooo,ooo be appropriated…
  • p. 153 …When President Roosevelt initiated the move toward re- I 16
  • p. 160 …T h e first step was made public on 3 September 1940 when President Roosevelt revealed…
  • p. 165 …These sentiments were expressed by President Roosevelt in a radio address on 3 September: “This Nation…
  • p. 169 …In an address to Congress on 6 January 1941, President Roosevelt suggested the means; 9 5…
  • p. 170 …O n 9 July 1941, President Roosevelt requested the secretaries of W a r and the…
  • p. 171 …The British had prepared, a t the instigation of President Roosevelt, an estimate of munitions requirements…
  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 174 …cent; other nations, 10 per cent.'" President Roosevelt, anxious that as many planes as possible be…
  • p. 185 …President Roosevelt’s request for the report had been motivated wholly by considerations of logistics. But…
  • p. 199 …On 5 July 1941 President Roosevelt, in oral orders to the Army Chief of Staff and…
  • p. 220 …and it carried a threat which President Roosevelt described in terms of the greatest danger faced…
  • p. 258 …conflict between Japan and the U.S. Roosevelt attempt curve our independence stop we all know…
  • p. 273 …President Roosevelt specifically directed that reinforcements should be sent there with all speed, and MacArthur was…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …evening, the British party met with President Roosevelt and his military and civilian advisers a t…
  • p. 297 …O n 3 January President Roosevelt sent Mr. Stimson a list of muni- tions, with a…
  • p. 301 …In his address to the Congress on 6 January, President Roosevelt promised that “we shall not…
  • p. 302 …Ultimate decisions on major military policies were taken by President Roosevelt, as Commander in Chief of…
  • p. 304 …Leahy as personal chief of staff to President Roosevelt in place of Admiral Stark.'* It was…
  • p. 322 …given to the nation by Presi- dent Roosevelt in a radio address on 9 D e…
  • p. 331 …At the end of January, President Roosevelt advised the President of Venezuela that, in deference to…
  • p. 332 …During the course of a fireside report to the nation delivered by President Roosevelt on 2…
  • p. 352 …Secretary Stimson reported to President Roosevelt his conviction that the planes from even one carrier could…
  • p. 366 …raised objections which seemed convincing.8 President Roosevelt decided to adopt the more modest proposal of…
  • p. 370 …Elliott Roosevelt during the summer on an aerial survey of the east coast of Greenland in…
  • p. 400 …Elliott Roosevelt and others failed to locate a suitable site for an airdrome.120A satisfactory site…
  • p. 409 …mobilizing the resources of the airlines, President Roosevelt had signed an executive order on 13 December…
  • p. 465 …for effective resistance in the Philippines, President Roosevelt had decided early in February that the general…
  • p. 480 …the basis of a proposal by President Roosevelt: there would be a separate Southwest Pacific Area…
  • p. 499 …Apparently President Roosevelt himself played a role in initiating the expedition, although it is not possible…
  • p. 553 …Lauchlin Currie had gone to China as economic adviser to President Roosevelt for study of her…
  • p. 630 …in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which the Prime…
  • p. 632 …plan was approved in principle by President Roosevelt, and on 8 April General Marshall and Harry…
  • p. 633 …message of 1 7 April, in- formed Roosevelt of his approval of the design; his sole…
  • p. 635 …A fortnight later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were alarmed by a query from Roosevelt as…
  • p. 640 …in Norway-and they understood that President Roosevelt’s anxiety to get U.S. troops into…
  • p. 641 …On 8 July the Prime Minister informed Roosevelt that conditions favorable to SLEDGE- HAMMER would probably…
  • p. 642 …on the ~ 4 t h . ~ ‘Ap- parently Roosevelt gave his tentative approval in a telephone conver…
  • p. 753 …This book shows the close relations between Roosevelt and the Committee T o Defend America by…
  • p. 755 …Address by President Roosevelt at Washington, 27 Oct. 1941, in Peace and War, pp. 767-72…
  • p. 756 …Ltr., Roosevelt to Stimson, 18 Sept. 1941,in WP I-General. I I I . Release of…
  • p. 774 …Memo for Roosevelt from Stim- son, 14 Mar. 1942. 163. lbid. 164. History, Sixth Air Force…
  • p. 776 …Elliott Roosevelt, zIst Recon. Sq. to TAG, 8 Sept. 1941; memo for Col. Olds from Capt…
  • p. 779 …Elliott Roosevelt to TAG, 6 July 1941; Atlantic Bridge, pp. 27-29. 117. Ltr., Sec. of…
  • p. 780 …Elliott Roosevelt to T A G , 3 Aug. 1941 (Report # 3 ) ; ltr., Capt. Elliott Roosevelt to…
  • p. 782 …Memo for S / W from President Roosevelt, 6 May 1942, in ATC 321. 199. On the…
  • p. 790 …Mills to TAG, Mac- Arthur for Roosevelt, 11 Feb. 1942; msg. #5, Australia to Marshall, 2…
  • p. 802 …President Roosevelt had approved the induction as early as 18 December 1941, contingent upon approval of…
  • p. 857 …See also Coolidge; Harding; Roosevelt; Wilson. Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment…
  • p. 858 …Erwin, 330, 339-41, 512 Roosevelt, Capt. Elliott, 3 18, 344 Roosevelt, Pres. F.D., 101…
T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A K , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
AAF staff had assumed on this occasion a position of equality with
those of the older arms.
T h e air planners, in framing AWPD/r, explicitly accepted the
general principles of ABC-I and the specific allocation of tasks in
RAINBOW No. 5. Under these guides the Army air mission was
conceived as entailing three tasks: to conduct air operations in defense
of the Western Hemisphere; to assist in the strategic defense in the
Pacific; and to wage an unremitting air offensive against Germany
and lands occupied by its forces-including, if necessary, the support
of a final invasion of the continent. T h e time schedule was somewhat
complicated. T h e war was viewed as consisting of three phases: ( I )
the period until M-day, characterized by rapid expansion of forces
and production, while measures short of war were being continued;
( 2 ) M-day until completion of preparations, characterized by a
strategic defensive against Japan and a mounting weight of attack
against Germany; and ( 3 ) the all-out attack on Europe. It was
assumed that the air offensive in Europe could be initiated in April
I 942, but that productive capacity and training would not support
the all-out offensive until April 1944. Consequently allocation of air
units was calculated in terms of an interim program and of an ulti-
mate force which included aircraft models as yet in the early experi-
mental stage.l4'
T o furnish air defense for the Western Hemisphere and for our
overseas possessions, a force of twenty-three bombardment and thirty-
one pursuit groups (each of the latter including three day and one
night interceptor squadrons) was planned. These forces were desig-
nated for specific bases in the continental United States; in the
Philippines, Hawaii, and Alaska; and in South America, the Carib-
bean, the Canal Zone, and the northeast area of North America. O n
the assumption that the air offensive against Germany would mini-
mize danger of an attack from that direction, these forces were in
general oriented toward Japan, and provision was made to transfer
six pursuit groups to Europe for the final 0 f f e n ~ i v e . l ~ ~
It is obvious that aircraft based in Alaska, Hawaii, and even on the
West Coast would contribute toward the strategic defensive against
Japan, and that beyond that the major responsibility would fall to
the Navy. But because of the importance of the Philippines in light
of the stiffening of U.S. policies in the Far East, it was proposed to
add to the air forces in those islands one pursuit and two heavy
'47

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.