“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A K , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
AAF staff had assumed on this occasion a position of equality with
those of the older arms.
T h e air planners, in framing AWPD/r, explicitly accepted the
general principles of ABC-I and the specific allocation of tasks in
RAINBOW No. 5. Under these guides the Army air mission was
conceived as entailing three tasks: to conduct air operations in defense
of the Western Hemisphere; to assist in the strategic defense in the
Pacific; and to wage an unremitting air offensive against Germany
and lands occupied by its forces-including, if necessary, the support
of a final invasion of the continent. T h e time schedule was somewhat
complicated. T h e war was viewed as consisting of three phases: ( I )
the period until M-day, characterized by rapid expansion of forces
and production, while measures short of war were being continued;
( 2 ) M-day until completion of preparations, characterized by a
strategic defensive against Japan and a mounting weight of attack
against Germany; and ( 3 ) the all-out attack on Europe. It was
assumed that the air offensive in Europe could be initiated in April
I 942, but that productive capacity and training would not support
the all-out offensive until April 1944. Consequently allocation of air
units was calculated in terms of an interim program and of an ulti-
mate force which included aircraft models as yet in the early experi-
mental stage.l4'
T o furnish air defense for the Western Hemisphere and for our
overseas possessions, a force of twenty-three bombardment and thirty-
one pursuit groups (each of the latter including three day and one
night interceptor squadrons) was planned. These forces were desig-
nated for specific bases in the continental United States; in the
Philippines, Hawaii, and Alaska; and in South America, the Carib-
bean, the Canal Zone, and the northeast area of North America. O n
the assumption that the air offensive against Germany would mini-
mize danger of an attack from that direction, these forces were in
general oriented toward Japan, and provision was made to transfer
six pursuit groups to Europe for the final 0 f f e n ~ i v e . l ~ ~
It is obvious that aircraft based in Alaska, Hawaii, and even on the
West Coast would contribute toward the strategic defensive against
Japan, and that beyond that the major responsibility would fall to
the Navy. But because of the importance of the Philippines in light
of the stiffening of U.S. policies in the Far East, it was proposed to
add to the air forces in those islands one pursuit and two heavy
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