The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A K , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
AAF staff had assumed on this occasion a position of equality with
those of the older arms.
T h e air planners, in framing AWPD/r, explicitly accepted the
general principles of ABC-I and the specific allocation of tasks in
RAINBOW No. 5. Under these guides the Army air mission was
conceived as entailing three tasks: to conduct air operations in defense
of the Western Hemisphere; to assist in the strategic defense in the
Pacific; and to wage an unremitting air offensive against Germany
and lands occupied by its forces-including, if necessary, the support
of a final invasion of the continent. T h e time schedule was somewhat
complicated. T h e war was viewed as consisting of three phases: ( I )
the period until M-day, characterized by rapid expansion of forces
and production, while measures short of war were being continued;
( 2 ) M-day until completion of preparations, characterized by a
strategic defensive against Japan and a mounting weight of attack
against Germany; and ( 3 ) the all-out attack on Europe. It was
assumed that the air offensive in Europe could be initiated in April
I 942, but that productive capacity and training would not support
the all-out offensive until April 1944. Consequently allocation of air
units was calculated in terms of an interim program and of an ulti-
mate force which included aircraft models as yet in the early experi-
mental stage.l4'
T o furnish air defense for the Western Hemisphere and for our
overseas possessions, a force of twenty-three bombardment and thirty-
one pursuit groups (each of the latter including three day and one
night interceptor squadrons) was planned. These forces were desig-
nated for specific bases in the continental United States; in the
Philippines, Hawaii, and Alaska; and in South America, the Carib-
bean, the Canal Zone, and the northeast area of North America. O n
the assumption that the air offensive against Germany would mini-
mize danger of an attack from that direction, these forces were in
general oriented toward Japan, and provision was made to transfer
six pursuit groups to Europe for the final 0 f f e n ~ i v e . l ~ ~
It is obvious that aircraft based in Alaska, Hawaii, and even on the
West Coast would contribute toward the strategic defensive against
Japan, and that beyond that the major responsibility would fall to
the Navy. But because of the importance of the Philippines in light
of the stiffening of U.S. policies in the Far East, it was proposed to
add to the air forces in those islands one pursuit and two heavy
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