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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
supported by charts and tables than those of the older services. That
the AAF made a separate report was most unusual; it was also highly
significant.
Within the War Department, responsibility for giving effect to the
President’s directive, in respect both to the Army’s ground and air
arms, devolved upon the War Plans Division. Late in July, Lt. Col.
Clayton L. Bissell, an air officer in that division, consulted with
General Arnold on the best method of determining the Army’s avia-
tion needs. It was indicative of the temper of the AAF that, in spite
of its limited autonomy under AR 95-5 of 2 0 June 1941,* a decision
was reached to allow the newly formed Air War Plans Division to
prepare the estimate independently as an Air Staff agency rather than
as individuals subordinate to the General Staff’s WPD. And AWPD
was not as unprepared for the task as might be expected in view of
its extreme youth. It included a number of officers, previously associ-
ated with the Air Corps Tactical School, who were deeply imbued
with the potentialities of air power. One of these, Maj. Haywood S.
Hansell, Jr., had accumulated target information in the intelligence
section of the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps and had just
returned from England with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is seldom
known. A number of officers from the several staff agencies of the
AAF, including the OCAC, contributed information which went into
AWPD/I. But the document was put together by a committee con-
sisting of Col. Harold L. George, division chief, Lt. Col. Kenneth N.
Walker, and Majs. Laurence S. Kuter and Haywood S. Hansell, and
apparently these airmen were chiefly responsible for the strategic
concepts.’ 38
Work on the plan began on 4 August; completed on the I Ith, it
was accepted by G-3 after an oral presentation and drawn up in final
form the following day. Subsequently it was approved by WPD,
General Arnold, General Marshall, Mr. Lovett, and Mr. Stimson, and
was included in the Joint Board’s report of I I September.13’ Perhaps
its ready acceptance was partly due to the pressure of time in meeting
the President’s directive, for irrespective of the intrinsic merits of
AWPD/I, the views expressed therein were not wholly consistent
with those of the W a r Department. Tacitly, though not legally, the
* See above, p. 1x5.
146

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.