“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
supported by charts and tables than those of the older services. That
the AAF made a separate report was most unusual; it was also highly
significant.
Within the War Department, responsibility for giving effect to the
President’s directive, in respect both to the Army’s ground and air
arms, devolved upon the War Plans Division. Late in July, Lt. Col.
Clayton L. Bissell, an air officer in that division, consulted with
General Arnold on the best method of determining the Army’s avia-
tion needs. It was indicative of the temper of the AAF that, in spite
of its limited autonomy under AR 95-5 of 2 0 June 1941,* a decision
was reached to allow the newly formed Air War Plans Division to
prepare the estimate independently as an Air Staff agency rather than
as individuals subordinate to the General Staff’s WPD. And AWPD
was not as unprepared for the task as might be expected in view of
its extreme youth. It included a number of officers, previously associ-
ated with the Air Corps Tactical School, who were deeply imbued
with the potentialities of air power. One of these, Maj. Haywood S.
Hansell, Jr., had accumulated target information in the intelligence
section of the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps and had just
returned from England with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is seldom
known. A number of officers from the several staff agencies of the
AAF, including the OCAC, contributed information which went into
AWPD/I. But the document was put together by a committee con-
sisting of Col. Harold L. George, division chief, Lt. Col. Kenneth N.
Walker, and Majs. Laurence S. Kuter and Haywood S. Hansell, and
apparently these airmen were chiefly responsible for the strategic
concepts.’ 38
Work on the plan began on 4 August; completed on the I Ith, it
was accepted by G-3 after an oral presentation and drawn up in final
form the following day. Subsequently it was approved by WPD,
General Arnold, General Marshall, Mr. Lovett, and Mr. Stimson, and
was included in the Joint Board’s report of I I September.13’ Perhaps
its ready acceptance was partly due to the pressure of time in meeting
the President’s directive, for irrespective of the intrinsic merits of
AWPD/I, the views expressed therein were not wholly consistent
with those of the W a r Department. Tacitly, though not legally, the
* See above, p. 1x5.
146