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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“United Press”36 pages
T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1 the foundations of the war machine and national morale. This they proposed to accomplish by blockade, subversive activities and propa- ganda, and aerial bombardment. T h e bomber offensive should be carried out on a scale far beyond any previous attempts-should be limited, in fact, only by the number of aircraft which could operate from United Kingdom airfields-and to that end the production of heavy bombers should be given highest priority once the needs of defensive security had been met. By concentrated bombardment of transportation centers and the industrial areas surrounding them, it was thought that cumulative efforts would seriously weaken the Ger- man ability and will to resist. In fact, it seemed possible that these methods alone might induce Germany to sue for peace and that the role of the British army could be limited to that of an armv of occupation. Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h e British chiefs of staff did not envisage the use of the vast numbers of infantrymen used in 1914-18. Rather the invading force would be made up largely of armored divisions, which would in a war of move- ment liberate one area after another, turning each over in turn to local patriots who had been secretly armed in advance. T h e British were not willing to say this task could not be done without active American participation (though men like Wave11 and Auchinleck were publicly saying just that),12’ but certainly the process would be accelerated if “the American bomber effort would increasingly swell the air offen- sive against Germany and in the final phase American armoured forces would participate.” Whatever the immediate reaction of the US. leaders may have been, their formal reply, requested by the British and submitted in a memorandum of 2 5 September,13’ indicates that they interpreted the review as diverging significantly from the strategy advocated in ABC-I for the defeat of Germany. They professed an adherence to the list of offensive means prescribed by that document, whether America entered the war or not, and they felt that the objectives described in the review were lacking in precision. They gave an itemized com- ment, paragraph by paragraph, but their most important criticism was centered on two general points. First, they took exception to the bombing objectives, decrying the apparent emphasis on attack upon civilian morale. Second, they believed that too much faith was placed in the “probability of success solely through the employment of ‘43
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