The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R IT
that is, while lend-lease was being debated and while the staff con-
versations were in progress I2’-and they were brought to fruition in
a conference on board HMS Prince of Wales in the Atlantic off
Argentia, Newfoundland. The only official document published after
the meeting, the so-called Atlantic Charter of 14 August, was politi-
cal rather than military in nature.”’ The signators were frank enough
in their denunciation of the “Hitlerite government” and in their faith
in the “final destruction of the Nazi tyranny,” and they made passing
allusion to “steps which their countries are respectively taking for
their safety” in the face of Nazi aggression. There was no overt refer-
ence to joint Anglo-American military operations, though there was
pointed reference to the attendance of “high-ranking officers of their
military, naval, and air services.” The President on his return identi-
fied in a press conference the members of the U.S. ‘delegation, which
included the chiefs of staff, General Arnold, and the heads of the
service war planning agen~ies.“~Even in the absence of a fuller report
on the conference it was obvious to any literate citizen that those
officers had not boarded the Prince of Wales to discuss the Four
Freedoms.
After the return of the President and his party, the problems of
joint strategy were examined by the military staffs, both in discussion
of ABC-I and of a new review of general strategy presented in a
paper by the three British chiefs of staff on I I August.12*This con-
sisted of a concise appreciation of the current situation in the several
areas of actual and threatened conflict and an analysis of present and
future strategy; its outlook was, properly, British rather than joint.
Between the drafting of ABC-I and the presentation of this review
a new factor of extraordinary importance had occurred in the attack
on the U.S.S.R. by Hitler. Initial German victories did not excite too
much optimism for Soviet success, but Germany’s preoccupation with
a major eastern front a t least precluded any chance of an invasion
of England in 1941.Whether the new situation brought any radical
change in British thinking or, indeed, whether the review was any-
thing more than an elaboration of views expressed in ABC-I is not
clear, but to the U.S. chiefs of staff it seemed that the strategic sum-
mary now presented departed somewhat from the principles earlier
agreed upon.
The British started with the familiar assumption that Germany was
too strong to attack frontally without a preliminary undermining of
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