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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1 sion; a 45 M Force to prevent enemy seizure of the west coast of South America; a 90 M Force to serve in like fashion for northeast Brazil; and a 180 M Force to serve for the protection of other areas in Latin America or to prepare for the eventual offensive in Europe. T h e air units assigned to these forces were wholly inadequate by any standards, though some provision was made for reinforcement by units from the general reserve. T h e general reserve included all Air Corps units not otherwise assigned, and the air mission included aid in defense of the Western Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica- tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within range. T h e Chief, AAF was to be charged with the organization, planning, training, and execution of active air defense measures for the continental United States, under W a r Department GHQ; and for preparation of plans, in conjunction with the commander concerned, for movement of air echelons of the several task forces. RAINBOW No. 5 was approved by the Joint Board on 14 May and within three weeks by the secretaries of W a r and the Navy.'" During the next six months, no change was effected in the basic prin- ciples of the plan, but in view of developments in the international situation and in U.S. forces available, modifications in detail were necessary. O n 19 November the Joint Board approved Revision No. I to the Basic Plan. This provided for the reinforcement of air units in the Far East and for some changes in the command arrangements in that area, and it established a more substantial initial increment for the air force in the United Kingdom. Actually, the Air Staff had never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l z 4 T h e plan was based on an "M plus" time schedule which might have been satisfactory for mobilizing and committing an air force in being. But in view of the current inadequate strength of the AAF and the impossibility of predicting its status on an M-day which would prob- ably be determined by the enemy, any but minimum commitments for air necessarily remained highly unrealistic. Approval of RAINBOW No. 5 by the two secretaries confirmed the strategic principles advocated earlier in the staff conversations, but a discussion of the problems involved was reopened at the govern- mental level in mid-August at the Atlantic conference between the President and the Prime Minister. According to the President, plans for such a meeting had been under consideration as early as February- '4'
Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.