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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“United Press”36 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 completed; the specific role of the Army was described in a War Department operations plan and a concentration plan.1zo Insofar as general concepts were concerned, RAINBOW No. 5 accepted all the major theses of ABC-I; that is, the assumptions, the over-all strategy, and the principles governing strategic direction and theater command were identical. In essence, RAINBOW No. 5 con- stituted a more detailed plan for the accomplishment of the tasks assigned to the United States in the staff conversations. For the Army, M-day would be designated only by direction of the Secretary of War, though certain tasks of a precautionary nature might precede M-day or any formal declaration of war. The plan designated the coastal frontiers and defense commands to be activated on M-day within areas of U.S. strategic direction, and the areas to be occupied in Europe. For each command, the mission of the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described, and a detailed breakdown was given, by specific units, of the forces allocated. Most Army forces available for M-day were to be deployed either in Western Hemisphere defense commands or in the Hawaiian and Philippine coastal frontiers, with strictly defensive missions. The only exception was in the European theater, and even there, where the United States was to exert its principal effort, initial operations were to be preponderantly naval (protection of shipping) and aerial (bom- bardment of Germany). Hence the Army forces set up for early deployment in that theater were not large: pursuit units and ground forces for the defense of US.base areas in the United Kingdom and for relief of British troops in Iceland and Ireland; a token force (ground) to aid in defense of England; and the bombardment force for the air attack on Germany. In addition to these forces assigned for deployment before or on M-day, both a strategic and a general reserve were established. It was understood that even for defensive purposes certain tactical offensives of a precautionary nature might be required-the President, for ex- ample, was publicly declaring our disinclination to allow Hitler to seize certain strategic spots in the Atlantic.121 Hence the strategic reserve was set up in increments with those tasks in mind: a 2 5 M Force (that is, a force to be brought into existence on M-day plus 25) to aid Marines in occupying Dakar or Freetown, or in defending the Azores, Cape Verde, or Canary Islands against possible Nazi aggres- 140
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