“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
editors or to the contributors to this and succeeding volumes and that
the sum thus saved will be used to reduce the sale cost of each volume.
And now a few words about the authors. For obvious reasons they
were chosen from the staff which had been engaged in the program
during the war. They bring to their respective assignments, then, a
familiarity with the problems, the personalities, and the sources gained
in several years of research, often at the headquarters most intimately
concerned. Several were civilian employees of the Historical Office in
Washington, but for the most part they were officers who had served
in the Air Staff there, in a Zone of the Interior command, or in a thea-
ter of operations. It would be naive to suppose that their interpretations
have been unaffected by their military experiences. But the authors,
like most members of the wartime Army, were civilians in uniform
rather than professional soldiers. In all cases the period of academic
training and practice exceeded in length that of military indoctrination
and service; the authors were citizens and taxpayers before, and after,
their tour of military duty, and they have felt called on to write no
official apologia. Service loyalties they undoubtedly carried with them
in returning to their academic posts, but not to the degree that their
critical faculties have been submerged. They have written as present
scholars rather than as former Air Carps officers.
Of the individual contributors to this volume, the following bio-
graphical facts are pertinent. Maj. James L. Cate, as a member of the
staff of the Historical Office, devoted his attention chiefly to the prob-
lems of strategic bombardment and after June 1944served as historical
officer of the Twentieth Air Force. Miss Kathleen Williams’ research
and writing, done under the immediate direction of the chief of the
Operational History Branch, ranged over varied fields of AAF organi-
zation and operation according to the immediate need of the moment.
Maj. Richard L. Watson for three years carried the main responsibility
in the office for the Southwest Pacific; Maj. Kramer J. Rohfleisch held
a similar responsibility for the remainder of the Pacific; and Maj.
Herbert Weaver bore the responsibility for the China-Burma-India
theater. Capt. William A. Goss served as historian with the Fourth Air
Force and was subsequently brought into AAF Headquarters for study
of continental air defenses. Lt. Arthur B. Ferguson divided his atten-
tion between antisubmarine operations and the Combined Bomber
Offensive. Capt. John D. Carter served first as historian of the South
Atlantic Wing, Air Transport Command, and after chat at Headquar-
xviii