Documents / Document
This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Churchill”21 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 for an eventual land offensive against Germany; and capture of posi- tions from which eventually the offensive could be launched. The mission of the several services was described in most general terms. In respect to aviation, it would be the policy of the associated powers to achieve as rapidly as possible “superiority of air strength over that of the enemy, particularly in long-range striking forces.” The Air Corps was to support ground and naval forces in defense of the Western Hemisphere and of U.S. overseas possessions and bases, and in operations in the Atlantic area. Of special significance, “U.S. Army air bombardment units [would] operate offensively in collabo- ration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against German Military Power at its source.’’ T o insure sound direction of the united effort, two principles of command were accepted: unity of command within each theater and integrity of national forces. The danger zones of the worId were divided into “areas” and the United States or Britain was charged with the strategic direction of all forces of the associated powers operating within each of those areas. Forces of either power operating under strategic direction of the other were not to be distributed in detail or attached to the ally’s units, but were normally to function as organized task forces performing specific missions. In joint tactical operations, that officer of either power who was senior in rank or grade would command. The allocation of areas of responsibility was dictated largely by the predominant interests of the respective powers-that is, the eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and Near East areas went to the British, the western Atlantic and the Pacific to the United States. Arrange- ments for the Far East, in which the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands each had vital interests, did not conform to this general pattern. There, command of naval forces was divided between the commanders in chief of the British China Fleet and the U.S. Asiatic Fleet; army ground and air forces in each territory were to operate under their own commanders, with such co-ordination as might be effected in the theater. An annex to the report’” listed, by areas, the forces to be made available for deployment by both powers and the general mission therein of each of the services. Deployment estimates were not uni- formly precise, being usually based on calculated strengths as of I April 1941, but in some cases being projected into the future. Air 1 3 8
Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.