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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Fuller”7 pages
T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1 the British Commonwealth might defeat Germany and her allies “should the United States be compelled to resort to war”; to co-ordi- nate broadly plans for employment of forces, and to reach agreements for military co-operation, including the delineation of areas of respon- sibility, the principles of command, and the forces to be involved. In respect to materiel, the planners agreed that the United States would continue aid to Britain and other Axis opponents, reserving such supplies as were necessary for the United States and its associates. Basic to all military considerations was the assumption that an American war with Germany would involve Italy certainly and prob- ably Japan. Strategy then had to be conceived on a world-wide pat- tern. Within this framework, defensive policies stemmed from the fact that the great sources of strength of the associated powers-in manpower and productive capacity-were located in the United States and in England. Hence the United States must deploy its forces so as to insure the absolute security of the Western Hemisphere, while the chief concern of the British should be for the United Kingdom. T o preserve also the ultimate safety of the British Commonwealth, it would be necessary to maintain a strong position in the Near East, India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical support of these widely scattered regions depended, must be the con- cern of both powers. Offensive strategy was based on the belief that since Germany was the predominant member of the Axis, “the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre.” Hence the main United States (and British) effort was to be exerted in that theater, and oper- ations elsewhere would be conducted in such fashion as would facili- tate that effort. Accordingly, the United States would not increase its existing military strength in the Far East, but would depend largely on the U.S. Pacific Fleet to weaken Japanese economy and indirectly to support the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength from Malaysia. The long-term pattern of offensive action against Germany was described. Measures were to include: economic pressure by blockade and other means; “a sustained air offensive against German Military Power, supplemented by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which contribute to that power”; early elimination of Italy; raids and minor offensives against the continent; support of all neutrals and belligerents who opposed the Axis; the build-up of forces ‘ 3 7
Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.