The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
mitments, supplies were to be divided equally between the British and
the Soviets.11
Whether stated in specific terms or in percentage, the import of
these schedules was the same. On the very eve of war the AAF was
working under an allocation system which made impossible the early
achievement of its 54-group program. T h e principle which since sum-
mer of 1940 had favored aid to the Allies over the needs of our own
air arm was clear enough; as the Slessor Agreement put it, allocations
of air materiel to the using services should be governed by their respec-
tive abilities to “absorb it usefully.” Obviously the most useful em-
ployment of a weapon is in combat, and in the broad view the policy
seemed justified by the time it afforded us. Perhaps the policy might
have been modified had it been realized earlier that war would come
in 1941;efforts to increase heavy bombardment strength in the Pacific
seem to suggest this. Much of the AAF’s loss to foreign services was
in “futures,” but actual diversions and the difficulty of systematic
development in the face of constantly fluctuating allotments help
explain its far-from-perfect preparedness on M-day. W a r was to bring
no easy solution to the problems of aid to the Allies, but it was to
bring a sharp revision in aircraft allocation schedules.
Strategic Plans
Not least important of our defense measures was the formulation of
strategic and operational plans. This activity was intimately associated
with the other phases of our preparations for war, and like them was
profoundly influenced by events in Europe and Asia. Again the
summer of 1940 may be viewed as a turning point in our national
policies. Before that season the US. service staffs had been at work on
a number of alternative plans, each based on a different set of contin-
gencies. T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy, but they had to assume potential allies as well as
potential enemies. Until the spring of 1940, we could be confident that
in a war against the Axis we would enjoy powerful support from the
British and French; after Dunkirk, the prospect was less sanguine.
Germany and Italy controlled, as conquered territory or as satellite
states, much of Europe; Spain was friendly to the Axis, the U.S.S.R.
bound by nonaggression treaties. T h e Tripartite Pact, signed at Berlin
on 2 7 September 1940, which brought Japan into the Axis gave official
notice of an alliance already suspected. In view of the collapse of
‘ 3 5