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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“The Wash”17 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 wealth, 50 per cent; U.S.S.R., 3 0 per cent; China, 10 per cent; other nations, 10 per cent.'" President Roosevelt, anxious that as many planes as possible be sent to the British, requested from the Secretary of War an estimate of the number of aircraft, by types, which could be provided the British during each remaining month of the fiscal year. As a basis for calcula- tion, he suggested maintaining the existing agreement until 3 I Decem- ber, thereafter allotting to the British 5 0 per cent of the total monthly production until 3 0 June 1942. The estimates which Mr. Stimson presented, following air staff figures, allowed for more than 50 per cent export in some types; but he strongly urged that until minimum defense requirements were met, we reserve heavy bomber production for the AAF. The President agreed that Hawaii and the Philippines should receive their allotted heavy bomber groups but hoped to get some B-17's or B - 2 4 , ~for England after February 1942.~'' Meanwhile another proposed allocation scheme had been prepared in London by representatives of the U S . and British staffs. Known informally as the Slessor Agreement, this plan called for a severe curtailment of the 54-group program to a total of 3,5 16 tactical planes. Production thus released should be made available to the British unul such time as the United States might enter the war, when capacity should be divided as the situation demanded.l13 Subsequent discussion tentatively raised the allotment to the AAF by 2 5 per cent, to 4,395 planes, but even this figure was unsatisfactory to the Air Staff. Appar- ently the Slessor plan was not approved, and as a practical compromise, AWPD/z was revised to take cognizance of the most recent produc- tion figures and the latest commitments to the U.S.S.R."" Approved by the Chief of Staff and promulgated by General Arnold on 29 October as a "basis for establishing priorities for the allocation of air- craft," this schedule made available to the AAF 4,189 tactical planes, 6,634 to Great Britain, 1,835 to the Soviet Union, 407 to China, and 109 to other nations. On 3 December, the War Department set up a rule of thumb to guide lend-lease allocations, ground and air alike. The Soviet protocol was to be maintained as a minimum, with increased supplies being sent as soon as possible. Lend-lease materiel was, in the absence of other qualifying factors, to be divided thus: 40 per cent to the United Kingdom; 40 per cent to the U.S.S.R.; 10 per cent to China; 10 per cent to other powers. Where there were no other com- 134
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