“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
wealth, 50 per cent; U.S.S.R., 3 0 per cent; China, 10 per cent; other
nations, 10 per cent.'"
President Roosevelt, anxious that as many planes as possible be sent
to the British, requested from the Secretary of War an estimate of the
number of aircraft, by types, which could be provided the British
during each remaining month of the fiscal year. As a basis for calcula-
tion, he suggested maintaining the existing agreement until 3 I Decem-
ber, thereafter allotting to the British 5 0 per cent of the total monthly
production until 3 0 June 1942. The estimates which Mr. Stimson
presented, following air staff figures, allowed for more than 50 per cent
export in some types; but he strongly urged that until minimum
defense requirements were met, we reserve heavy bomber production
for the AAF. The President agreed that Hawaii and the Philippines
should receive their allotted heavy bomber groups but hoped to get
some B-17's or B - 2 4 , ~for England after February 1942.~''
Meanwhile another proposed allocation scheme had been prepared
in London by representatives of the U S . and British staffs. Known
informally as the Slessor Agreement, this plan called for a severe
curtailment of the 54-group program to a total of 3,5 16 tactical planes.
Production thus released should be made available to the British unul
such time as the United States might enter the war, when capacity
should be divided as the situation demanded.l13 Subsequent discussion
tentatively raised the allotment to the AAF by 2 5 per cent, to 4,395
planes, but even this figure was unsatisfactory to the Air Staff. Appar-
ently the Slessor plan was not approved, and as a practical compromise,
AWPD/z was revised to take cognizance of the most recent produc-
tion figures and the latest commitments to the U.S.S.R."" Approved
by the Chief of Staff and promulgated by General Arnold on 29
October as a "basis for establishing priorities for the allocation of air-
craft," this schedule made available to the AAF 4,189 tactical planes,
6,634 to Great Britain, 1,835 to the Soviet Union, 407 to China, and
109 to other nations. On 3 December, the War Department set up a
rule of thumb to guide lend-lease allocations, ground and air alike. The
Soviet protocol was to be maintained as a minimum, with increased
supplies being sent as soon as possible. Lend-lease materiel was, in the
absence of other qualifying factors, to be divided thus: 40 per cent to
the United Kingdom; 40 per cent to the U.S.S.R.; 10 per cent to
China; 10 per cent to other powers. Where there were no other com-
134