“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
less expected British production, should be referred to the Office of
Production Management. British and U.S. military authorities in
Washington should then suggest any modifications required by the
realities of production potentials and fix the relative priorities of the
various types of munition^."^
The Anglo-American mission, proceeding to Moscow, met with
Stalin and his staff. On I October 1941,the first Soviet protocol was
signed by Mr. W.A. Harriman, Lord Beaverbrook, and Foreign Com-
missar Vyacheslav Molotov. The United States and Great Britain each
agreed to furnish the Soviet Air Force, in the period ending 3 0 June
1942, with 1,800 aircraft.'"' The U.S. mission had included a number
of air officers competent to offer technical advice, but details of the
air section of the protocol were elaborated later in the month in
Washington by General Arnold and Capt. H.H. Balfour, British
Under Secretary of State for Air.'Og According to the London agree-
ment, information concerning Soviet needs should have allowed the
rapid completion of plans for the so-called Victory Program. There
was hardly time in the crowded weeks before Pearl Harbor to co-ordi-
nate the several estimates with industrial potentials, but those estimates
were to form the basis of the Victory Program drawn up in the early
days of the war.
Future plans were of small help to the AAF in meeting current
needs, now rendered most urgent by growing pessimism over the
situation in the Pacific. Hence the task of maintaining firm and equi-
table commitments for short-term allocation of aircraft became pro-
gressively more difficult. At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made agree-
ments with the British concerning the number of AAF airplanes to be
made available through lend-lease.' lo On 9 September, General
Arnold's staff produced a new plan, AWPD/2, to cover the period I
October 1941-30 June 1942. AWPD/z recommended that the pro-
posed anti-Axis pool receive all aircraft produced under defense aid,
all British and other foreign contract planes, and I 5 per cent of combat
types built for the AAF. Out of an estimated total of 14,802 tactical
planes, this would give the pool 9,708 (66 per cent) and the AAF
5,094 (34 per cent). This figure was considered the minimum defense
requirement of the AAF; when it had been reached, 3 0 per cent of the
AAF's orders might be diverted for foreign needs. The pool should be
divided according to some such ratio as follows: British Common-
' 3 3