“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
2 6,416; monthly replacements, 2,2 76. Current procurement schedules
used in these estimates listed as on order or on approved programs
72,183 military aircraft, of which 43,320 were for the AAF, 9,457 for
Army defense aid (mostly for Britain), and 8,395 for direct British
contracts. T o attain its own goal of approximately 60,000 planes, the
AAF proposed to add to current schedules a fill-in program of 16,437
aircraft."
T h e huge forces recommended in AWPD/ I reflected the offensive
mission contemplated for the AAF in the new strategic plans. And just
as those plans were based on combined Anglo-American operations,
so also must plans for the vast munitions program be based on the needs
of the two powers and on their combined production potential. Ger-
many's attack on the U.S.S.R. on 2 2 June gave England a most valu-
able ally, but Soviet munitions requirements added to the problems of
allocation. Preliminary negotiations with a Soviet military mission
began in Washington in early August, and the U.S.S.R. was promised
among other items forty P-40's and five B-~g's.''~In September a
combined Anglo-American mission with full powers to formulate a
long-term supply program departed for Moscow. The American dele-
gates, en route, stopped over a t London and there, with the British
War Cabinet and the U.S. special observers, investigated the possi-
bilities of the proposed combined munitions program.
The British had prepared, a t the instigation of President Roosevelt,
an estimate of munitions requirements similar to that submitted by the
Joint Board on I I September.'O' From the information thus provided,
the President hoped to have formulated a Victory Program for the
creation of a huge pool of weapons for the common service of nations
opposing the Axis. Between 17 and 2 0 September, the British and
American estimates were examined jointly. Aircraft requirements
listed in AWPD/I were accepted tentatively, subject to deletion of
ten medium bombardment and twelve pursuit groups for which desig-
nated bases could not be provided. British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF
and the Fleet Air Arm, but not trainers or strategic reserve. Of these,
the British calculated they could build 35,832 by July 1943, leaving a
deficit of 13,553 to be made up by the United States.'" It was decided
in the London conference that the estimates of Soviet needs, when
obtained, should be added to these figures and that the resulting totals,
1 3 2