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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
to continue. In an address to Congress on 6 January 1941, President
Roosevelt suggested the means; 9 5 it became law with the defense-aid
act of 11 March, generally known as the Lend-Lease Under
this arrangement air materiel continued to be the most important item
of export, and it was essential to the success of the Air Corps program
that allocations under the new act be constantly reviewed in the light
of “changing political and strategic conditions.” In the machinery set
up for administering lend-lease, the Joint Aircraft Committee was
designated to serve as the Defense Aid Supply Committee for all avia-
tion materiel. The JAC thus acquired important administrative respon-
sibilities, but the broad policies governing the allotment of aid were
determined by the Pre~ident.~‘The fundamental policy for aircraft
was established within a few weeks, though the administrative details
continued to be subject to constant modification.
In the first lend-lease directive, the President extended its benefits to
Great Britain,g8thereby initiating the most powerful of the “measures
short of war” to aid that nation. It was not at all certain, however, that
such measures would be sufficient or that the United States could main-
tain its neutrality. On 27 March, Congress authorized the appropriation
of $7,000,000,000 for lend-lea~e.~~On the same day, committees repre-
senting the U.S. and British service staffs, which had been studying
jointly the best means of military collaboration if the United States
should join in the war, presented their first report (known as ABC-I)
on the grand strategy to be followed in a possible Anglo-American
war against the Axis.” T w o days later a second report, on air collabora-
tion, was submitted.100Known as ABC-2, this report recommended
that aircraft production be accelerated in both countries. As its first
objective, the United States should accomplish the AAF’s 54-group
program, with the view of employing a substantial portion of those
groups from England if America entered the war. The AAF should set
up as a further goal a program calling for roo groups, considered the
minimum requirement if the British Isles should be lost as a base for
our air forces. But it was also recommended that delivery of tactical
airplanes be made contingent upon the ability of the several services to
use them effectively and that therefore the AAF should defer the full
realization of its 54-group program to the extent that aircraft thus made
available could be used in the air offensive against Germany. Essen-
tially, this was an extension of the policy agreed on the previous July.
* See below, pp. 136-39.
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.