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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to “sweep the Germans from the sky…
  • p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with the ambitious idens of air power which…
  • p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was never equipped during…
  • p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are you in the Army or the Corps…
  • p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
  • p. 69 …But one axiom, with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never- theless left an open question as to how…
  • p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300 aircraft a month. The pattern of…
  • p. 122 …the German Air Force, the Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in the…
  • p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French factories, the force had never been employed in a…
  • p. 140 …into a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands of our own forces…
  • p. 150 …Long-term needs of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities never…
  • p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
  • p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
  • p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never- theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
  • p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
  • p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points have never been satisfactorily explained. T h e general pattern…
  • p. 277 …motors, sole- noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit- less search…
  • p. 288 …planners and from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate. The translation of the accepted grand…
  • p. 303 …the principal features of the plan were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
  • p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
  • p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
  • p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
  • p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
  • p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
  • p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
  • p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been accomplished, yet now it…
  • p. 509 …Island, in the Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May the two…
  • p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the aircrews, for on the operational level…
  • p. 524 …handicaps under which AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
  • p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that proper observance of economy of force would never…
  • p. 531 …Crews which had previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these weapons into…
  • p. 544 …But the Japanese never at any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
  • p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into All told, the record…
  • p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com- mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
  • p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
  • p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
  • p. 614 …that reason deserving a high priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
  • p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign- ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
  • p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
  • p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England, nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
  • p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never before equaled by the military forces of two…
  • p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
tained in regard to secret weapons; and the possible interference of
foreign orders with production for the Air Corps.91
Under the “Cash and Carry” act, various Air Corps models, some
obsolescent, some more modern, were released to France, England,
and other nations. O n 2 5 March 1940, a more liberal foreign release
policy was adopted, which authorized the sale to foreign states of
certain stipulated modern types” as soon as a superior type or model
could be furnished to the Air Corps.’* T h e crisis brought on by Ger-
man victories during the next three months greatly stimulated the
demand for planes on the part both of Britain and the United States.
T h e British assumed all aircraft contracts of the fallen French govern-
ment, and with these and their own orders their program called for
about 14,000 planes. T h e Air Corps’ new 54-group program called for
a total delivery, by I April 1942, of 2 1,470 tactical and training planes.
These huge orders, plus Navy demands, could not be filled within the
time limits set. Since English combat needs on the eve of the Battle of
Britain seemed more urgent than our own expansion requirements, it
was agreed on 2 3 July that the Air Corps should defer the delivery of
8,586 planes in favor of the British.g3 This agreement did not enjoin
the British from placing additional orders; and in the face of what
might develop into serious competition, the Air Corps feared that its
own program might further be retarded.
T o insure a systematic and equitable allocation of aircraft and
engines, an organization which came to be known as the Joint Aircraft
Committee (JAC) was established on I 3 September. It included repre-
sentatives of the three principal customers of the American aircraft
manufacturers-the British Purchasing Commission, the Navy’s Bureau
of Aeronautics, and the Air Corps. T h e Chief of the Air Corps, whose
office had taken the initiative in securing authorization for the JAC,
served as its chairman. Eventually the functions of the committee were
greatly extended. In January 1941it was given control over all foreign
contracts for aircraft materiel, and it became possible then to integrate
all production plans into a single
Existing legislation precluded the extension of loans to foreign
powers for financing the purchase of weapons in the United States,
and as British dollar credit shrank it became obvious that some new
method must be sought if the effort to supply Britain with arms was
B-17, B-24, B-25, B-26, A-ZOA,P-40, 0 - 5 2 , PT-IJB, PT-17, PT-18, PT-19, BT-13,
BT-14.

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.