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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
tained in regard to secret weapons; and the possible interference of
foreign orders with production for the Air Corps.91
Under the “Cash and Carry” act, various Air Corps models, some
obsolescent, some more modern, were released to France, England,
and other nations. O n 2 5 March 1940, a more liberal foreign release
policy was adopted, which authorized the sale to foreign states of
certain stipulated modern types” as soon as a superior type or model
could be furnished to the Air Corps.’* T h e crisis brought on by Ger-
man victories during the next three months greatly stimulated the
demand for planes on the part both of Britain and the United States.
T h e British assumed all aircraft contracts of the fallen French govern-
ment, and with these and their own orders their program called for
about 14,000 planes. T h e Air Corps’ new 54-group program called for
a total delivery, by I April 1942, of 2 1,470 tactical and training planes.
These huge orders, plus Navy demands, could not be filled within the
time limits set. Since English combat needs on the eve of the Battle of
Britain seemed more urgent than our own expansion requirements, it
was agreed on 2 3 July that the Air Corps should defer the delivery of
8,586 planes in favor of the British.g3 This agreement did not enjoin
the British from placing additional orders; and in the face of what
might develop into serious competition, the Air Corps feared that its
own program might further be retarded.
T o insure a systematic and equitable allocation of aircraft and
engines, an organization which came to be known as the Joint Aircraft
Committee (JAC) was established on I 3 September. It included repre-
sentatives of the three principal customers of the American aircraft
manufacturers-the British Purchasing Commission, the Navy’s Bureau
of Aeronautics, and the Air Corps. T h e Chief of the Air Corps, whose
office had taken the initiative in securing authorization for the JAC,
served as its chairman. Eventually the functions of the committee were
greatly extended. In January 1941it was given control over all foreign
contracts for aircraft materiel, and it became possible then to integrate
all production plans into a single
Existing legislation precluded the extension of loans to foreign
powers for financing the purchase of weapons in the United States,
and as British dollar credit shrank it became obvious that some new
method must be sought if the effort to supply Britain with arms was
B-17, B-24, B-25, B-26, A-ZOA,P-40, 0 - 5 2 , PT-IJB, PT-17, PT-18, PT-19, BT-13,
BT-14.

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.