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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
might enter the war, plans were developed to create by combined
effort a huge pool of weapons to serve all anti-Axis nations according
to their needs and capabilities.
At the outset of the European war, the sale and export of munitions
to belligerents were strictly curbed in the United States by the “neu-
trality legislation” of the 1930’s.On 4 January 1939, President Roose-
velt had pointed to a lesson from the immediate past: that “our
neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairly-may actually give
aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim.” 8 9 As successive victories
of Germany in Europe and of Japan in Asia made it appear expedient
that we extend material aid to nations resisting them, neutrality restric-
tions were progressively relaxed. The first step, the removal of the
arms embargo feature, was urged by the President in July 1939 and
again on 2 1 September; it was effected on 4 The new
“Cash and Carry” act allowed belligerents to acquire arms within the
United States by cash purchase. Effectively, of course, this applied
only to the Allies, and for them the great productive capacity of the
United States promised to be of prime importance. For the immediate
future, however, aid would be limited; the munitions industry in the
United States had only begun what was to be a tremendous growth,
and excessive foreign orders would impede both its orderly expansion
and that of our armed forces.
The Air Corps had long favored the sale to foreign powers of its
own tactical models and had attempted to liberalize War Department
policy in that respect. Originally this was through no particular desire
to aid any group of nations, and to a public made conscious of the
horrors of war by the “Merchants of Death” sort of literature, it was
not always popular. The Air Corps hoped, however, that quantity sales
abroad of its own models would promote expansion of the aircraft
industry without expense to the government, and would help defray
the cost of research and development of new planes. Little military
risk seemed to be involved, since we could stay ahead of any nation
which depended on us for air weapons; and in neutral countries which
did not support an aircraft industry the export of American military
planes could prove a valuable diplomatic weapon against the Axis.
Certain complex problems were inherent in such a policy: whether
planes should be released only to designated nations or to all alike;
how long a time lag to require between the acceptance of a new model
and its release abroad; the degree of security which should be main-
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.