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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
might enter the war, plans were developed to create by combined
effort a huge pool of weapons to serve all anti-Axis nations according
to their needs and capabilities.
At the outset of the European war, the sale and export of munitions
to belligerents were strictly curbed in the United States by the “neu-
trality legislation” of the 1930’s.On 4 January 1939, President Roose-
velt had pointed to a lesson from the immediate past: that “our
neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairly-may actually give
aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim.” 8 9 As successive victories
of Germany in Europe and of Japan in Asia made it appear expedient
that we extend material aid to nations resisting them, neutrality restric-
tions were progressively relaxed. The first step, the removal of the
arms embargo feature, was urged by the President in July 1939 and
again on 2 1 September; it was effected on 4 The new
“Cash and Carry” act allowed belligerents to acquire arms within the
United States by cash purchase. Effectively, of course, this applied
only to the Allies, and for them the great productive capacity of the
United States promised to be of prime importance. For the immediate
future, however, aid would be limited; the munitions industry in the
United States had only begun what was to be a tremendous growth,
and excessive foreign orders would impede both its orderly expansion
and that of our armed forces.
The Air Corps had long favored the sale to foreign powers of its
own tactical models and had attempted to liberalize War Department
policy in that respect. Originally this was through no particular desire
to aid any group of nations, and to a public made conscious of the
horrors of war by the “Merchants of Death” sort of literature, it was
not always popular. The Air Corps hoped, however, that quantity sales
abroad of its own models would promote expansion of the aircraft
industry without expense to the government, and would help defray
the cost of research and development of new planes. Little military
risk seemed to be involved, since we could stay ahead of any nation
which depended on us for air weapons; and in neutral countries which
did not support an aircraft industry the export of American military
planes could prove a valuable diplomatic weapon against the Axis.
Certain complex problems were inherent in such a policy: whether
planes should be released only to designated nations or to all alike;
how long a time lag to require between the acceptance of a new model
and its release abroad; the degree of security which should be main-
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.