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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Churchill”21 pages
T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 ’ they showed on the whole a high degree of T h e most important changes occurred after June I 940. On the eve of the European war, most Americans seemed to be confident of an ultimate victory for England and France; 8 4 and, if the blitzkrieg in Poland raised doubts, the “phony war” of the winter months allayed them.85T h e spectacular spring victories of the Nazis, climaxed by the fall of France, hit the United States like a cold douche. England’s chances of survival seemed at best no better than even, and our own immunity from war seemed challenged.86 German soldiers looking across the Straits of Dover were chanting “Today England, tomorrow the whole world.” T h e song, if somewhat boastful, did not sound like a lullaby in the United States. Our rearmament program was gaining momentum but wanted time for full achievement. T o many it appeared that we could complete that program without hos- tile interruptions only if the United Kingdom should continue as a belligerent with a fleet and an air force in being. So it was national self-interest as well as sympathy that led an increasing proportion of Americans to advocate measures in support of the British.87This view was aptly summarized in the title of the citizens’ group which most actively supported it-the Committee T o Defend America by Aiding the Allies. United States and British leaders declared, whether candidly or not, that these measures need go no further than making available to Eng- land the products of American industry and agriculture. Furnishing munitions did remain the most effective means of aiding the allies, though by autumn 1941“measures short of war” had carried us in the Atlantic to orders “to shoot on sight.”88 T h e task of providing weapons to England and other friendly powers, though undertaken in order that we might have time to arm our own forces, greatly compli- cated that process. Because of the limited capacity of a munitions industry not yet at peak performance, there was inevitably a conflict between the demands of the U.S. services and the allied nations, and the apportionment of weapons to our greatest advantage required rare judgment and tact and firmness. In the two years before Pearl Harbor there were numerous changes in the machinery for allocation and in the details of policy. But in respect to air materiel, the most important item involved, the administration tended after Dunkirk to favor Eng- land’s immediate combat needs over the requirements of Air Corps expansion. In the course of 1941;as it became more apparent that we 1 2 7
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