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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 47 …s Independent Force, the whole of the French Air Division (strategic reserve), and Italian and Portuguese…
  • p. 113 …Japanese Air Power The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air arms, had…
  • p. 119 …naval air service, and a colonial air force.” For their air doctrines, the Italians depended almost…
  • p. 120 …In its first “combat” test during the thirties the Italian Air Force faced no real opposition…
  • p. 121 …The hope was not fulfilled, for numerous weaknesses in the Italian Air Force rapidly came to…
  • p. 122 …The fundamental weakness of the Italian Air Force was not in its theory of air power…
  • p. 197 …naval forces, and within prescribed boundaries to destroy any German and Italian naval, air, and ground…
  • p. 386 …More threatening were Rommel’s forces in North Africa, for the very existence of the air…
  • p. 554 …Chennault, who since 1937 had been serving as special adviser to the Chinese Air Force. Known…
  • p. 705 …Brett, Chief of the Air Corps, to England for study of the problem. Specifically, he was…
  • p. 752 …USSBS, Japanese Air Power. 9. Notes on the Italian Air Force, in special file of Brig…
  • p. 805 …History, First Air Force. 44. History, Caribbean Air Force, 8 May 1941-6 Mar. 1942, p…
  • p. 851 …E S Italian Air Force: 82-85; development, Italian East Africa, 84 Italy, Air Ministry, 82…
  • p. 857 …See Italian Air Force. Reinforcements. See theaters. Renault works, 593 Replacement Control Depot, ~ z t h…
T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
press for such rights from Costa Rica or Ecuador, and there was no
westward extension of canal defenses until 1 9 4 2 . ~ ~
Farther west, the exposed position of our Pacific islands made im-
provement of their defense seem more urgent. It had long been con-
sidered axiomatic among our military leaders that the Philippines could
not be profitably defended, with the forces likely to be available for
use, against a determined Japanese attack. In I 94 I , however, measures
were taken to strengthen our forces there, particularly in air cate-
gories: a strong bombardment force would threaten the left flank of a
southward drive by the Japanese and hence might serve as a powerful
deterrent. Accordingly, in I 94 I there was an extension of air installa-
tions on Luzon and Mindanao and, belatedly, an effort to reinforce
air units stationed there.79
T h e key to our Pacific defenses was the Hawaiian Islands, or more
specifically, the naval base at Pearl Harbor. A m y air units in the
Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and other naval and
military installations on Oahu, and in the past had been concentrated
on that island. From 1939on, the Air Corps was attempting to increase
the range of the striking force which constituted its chief weapon. By
1941,auxiliary fields were set up in other islands of the group through
the aid of the CAA. This policy was carried further by the preparation
of landing strips on such far-flung islands as Midway, Johnston, Pal-
myra, Canton, and Christmas.80 While facilities at those locations
would support only limited operations and were not intended as
permanent bases for heavy bombers, the new airfields were indicative
of the gradual acceptance of AAF concepts of mobility and a posi-
tive defense; their most obvious utility lay in the fact that, with tran-
sit rights assured by the Australian government, they constituted a
means whereby heavy bombers could be ferried from the States, via
Hawaii, to Luzon. Local defense measures on Luzon and Oahu
included the reinforcement of fighter units there and the establishment
of fighter control sectors with radar warning equipment. These meas-
ures, like all others on those islands, proved inadequate against the
Japanese surprise attacks, but the advanced island airstrips were to be
of signal importance in the Pacific war.
Reinforcement of the northern corner of the Alaska-Hawaii-
Panama triangle also came relatively late. Since the 1920’s the Air
Corps had been calling attention to the strategic importance of Alaska
and to its vulnerability. In 1935, construction of an air base there had
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.