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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Churchill”21 pages
T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1 press for such rights from Costa Rica or Ecuador, and there was no westward extension of canal defenses until 1 9 4 2 . ~ ~ Farther west, the exposed position of our Pacific islands made im- provement of their defense seem more urgent. It had long been con- sidered axiomatic among our military leaders that the Philippines could not be profitably defended, with the forces likely to be available for use, against a determined Japanese attack. In I 94 I , however, measures were taken to strengthen our forces there, particularly in air cate- gories: a strong bombardment force would threaten the left flank of a southward drive by the Japanese and hence might serve as a powerful deterrent. Accordingly, in I 94 I there was an extension of air installa- tions on Luzon and Mindanao and, belatedly, an effort to reinforce air units stationed there.79 T h e key to our Pacific defenses was the Hawaiian Islands, or more specifically, the naval base at Pearl Harbor. A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and other naval and military installations on Oahu, and in the past had been concentrated on that island. From 1939on, the Air Corps was attempting to increase the range of the striking force which constituted its chief weapon. By 1941,auxiliary fields were set up in other islands of the group through the aid of the CAA. This policy was carried further by the preparation of landing strips on such far-flung islands as Midway, Johnston, Pal- myra, Canton, and Christmas.80 While facilities at those locations would support only limited operations and were not intended as permanent bases for heavy bombers, the new airfields were indicative of the gradual acceptance of AAF concepts of mobility and a posi- tive defense; their most obvious utility lay in the fact that, with tran- sit rights assured by the Australian government, they constituted a means whereby heavy bombers could be ferried from the States, via Hawaii, to Luzon. Local defense measures on Luzon and Oahu included the reinforcement of fighter units there and the establishment of fighter control sectors with radar warning equipment. These meas- ures, like all others on those islands, proved inadequate against the Japanese surprise attacks, but the advanced island airstrips were to be of signal importance in the Pacific war. Reinforcement of the northern corner of the Alaska-Hawaii- Panama triangle also came relatively late. Since the 1920’s the Air Corps had been calling attention to the strategic importance of Alaska and to its vulnerability. In 1935, construction of an air base there had 1 2 5
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