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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
devolved wholly upon units deployed in its immediate zone. Now
agreements with Great Britain made possible the construction of a
string of airfields in the Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trini-
dad, and British Guiana, as well as on Puerto Rico. These promised
effective control of the approaches to the Caribbean, and hence to the
canal. The AAF was able also to expand existing facilities in the Canal
Zone and to prepare auxiliary fields in Central American republics.
Agreements with those countries brought about a progressive liberali-
zation of flight restrictions, which greatly simplified air operations in
defense of the Zone. Farther south, comparable arrangements were
made. In November 1941, U.S. forces occupied Surinam (Dutch
Guiana) . The move, made in co-operation with the Netherlands and
Brazilian governments, was designed to protect the invaluable bauxite
mines of Surinam, and here as in Greenland and Iceland, the United
States was pledged to withdraw at the termination of the international
cri~is.'~Now, with bases in both British and Dutch Guiana, the United
States was in position to move forces, spearheaded by heavy bom-
bardment units, to thwart any threatened Axis invasion of the exposed
angle of Brazil. All told, the new bases would constitute, when garri-
soned by fully equipped air units, an effective defense in depth of the
most vital positions toward our south.
Reinforcement of hemisphere defenses on the Pacific side reflected
both our comparatively late appreciation of the Japanese threat and
the immediate concern with the European Axis. Hence, in magnitude
and number, the measures taken to strengthen the Alaska-Hawaii-
Panama triangle were less impressive than like activities in the Atlantic-
Caribbean areas. As relations with Japan sharply deteriorated in 1941,
means were readily authorized for improving Pacific defenses. But
time was running out; few of the measures were complete when Japan
attacked and some were only on paper. Almost without exception, the
several specific improvements made in the area had long been urged by
the Air Corps. By 1940 valuable aid had been obtained from the Civil
Aeronautics Authority, but in many instances action was incited only
by the advent of war. Thus in view of the vulnerability of the western
approaches to the Panama Canal, the Air Corps throughout the re-
armament period had wished to secure rights to establish air bases on
COCOSIsland and the Galapagos Islands, from which long-range
aircraft could patrol far beyond the striking range of a carrier task
force. It was the current policy of the government, however, not to
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