“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
devolved wholly upon units deployed in its immediate zone. Now
agreements with Great Britain made possible the construction of a
string of airfields in the Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trini-
dad, and British Guiana, as well as on Puerto Rico. These promised
effective control of the approaches to the Caribbean, and hence to the
canal. The AAF was able also to expand existing facilities in the Canal
Zone and to prepare auxiliary fields in Central American republics.
Agreements with those countries brought about a progressive liberali-
zation of flight restrictions, which greatly simplified air operations in
defense of the Zone. Farther south, comparable arrangements were
made. In November 1941, U.S. forces occupied Surinam (Dutch
Guiana) . The move, made in co-operation with the Netherlands and
Brazilian governments, was designed to protect the invaluable bauxite
mines of Surinam, and here as in Greenland and Iceland, the United
States was pledged to withdraw at the termination of the international
cri~is.'~Now, with bases in both British and Dutch Guiana, the United
States was in position to move forces, spearheaded by heavy bom-
bardment units, to thwart any threatened Axis invasion of the exposed
angle of Brazil. All told, the new bases would constitute, when garri-
soned by fully equipped air units, an effective defense in depth of the
most vital positions toward our south.
Reinforcement of hemisphere defenses on the Pacific side reflected
both our comparatively late appreciation of the Japanese threat and
the immediate concern with the European Axis. Hence, in magnitude
and number, the measures taken to strengthen the Alaska-Hawaii-
Panama triangle were less impressive than like activities in the Atlantic-
Caribbean areas. As relations with Japan sharply deteriorated in 1941,
means were readily authorized for improving Pacific defenses. But
time was running out; few of the measures were complete when Japan
attacked and some were only on paper. Almost without exception, the
several specific improvements made in the area had long been urged by
the Air Corps. By 1940 valuable aid had been obtained from the Civil
Aeronautics Authority, but in many instances action was incited only
by the advent of war. Thus in view of the vulnerability of the western
approaches to the Panama Canal, the Air Corps throughout the re-
armament period had wished to secure rights to establish air bases on
COCOSIsland and the Galapagos Islands, from which long-range
aircraft could patrol far beyond the striking range of a carrier task
force. It was the current policy of the government, however, not to
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