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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Newfoundland Airport at Gander Lake as soon as possible.68 T h e
latter arrangement paid respect to the capabilities of such German
bombers as the Heinkel I 17 and the obsolescent Heinkel I I I. Either
had range sufficient to fly from Norway to Newfoundland and thence,
with one refueling, to New York. Air Corps planes based at Gander
Lake could patrol the northeast approaches to the hemisphere and
could interdict Axis attempts to establish airfields on the continent or
on Greenland, some 800 miles to the
A second forward thrust of our defense outposts came on 9 April
1941with the signing of the United States-Danish agreement concern-
ing Greenland. Since the German occupation of Denmark on 9 April
1940, Greenland had been cut off from the mother country, but had
maintained its allegiance to the royal government. T h e people of
Greenland had early expressed the hope that the United States would
continue to keep in mind the exposed position of the island.7oUnited
States protection was warranted both by the Monroe Doctrine and the
Act of Havana. Reconnaissance flights over the island by Luftwaffe
aircraft and repeated German efforts to establish meteorological sta-
tions there seemed to demand some action on our part; the Greenland
coast was only 1,500 miles from Nazi bases in Norway, and weather
reports from the island would have been helpful to the Luftwaffe in
planning air operations against England. T h e joint agreement of April
I 94 I clarified U.S. responsibilities in defending Greenland, while
granting to the government of the United States the right to construct,
maintain, and operate such landing fields and other facilities as might
be necessary in fulfilling its obligations." A south Greenland survey
expedition, composed of Army and Navy personnel, had sailed from
the United States on 18 March 1941, and during the remaining spring
months possible airfield sites were inspected and plans were made for
establishing the needed stations." T h e fields, when finished, were to
improve the northern air route to England, but their first purpose was
defensive. Their completion had become a matter of urgency with a
German air attack in February against Iceland, only 400 miles to the
That attack argued too for the next eastward advance of the Ameri-
can line of defense. Only by a geographical tour de force could Ice-
land, lying athwart the twentieth meridian, be brought into the
Western Hemisphere. But of its strategic importance there could be
no doubt. In German hands it would have constituted a grave menace
I 2 2

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