The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
(Kilner Board) called for the development of two new heavy bomb-
ers, with radii of 2 , 0 0 0 and 3,000 miles re~pectively.~~A year later,
when the fall of England seemed a possibility which might deny us
any friendly base within striking distance of German airfields and
ports, plans were begun for a 4,000-mile-radius bomber.57Funds were
now available for research and development, and projects were initi-
ated which were in time to produce the B-29 and B-32, the XB-35
and XB-36. These planes were not expected to be ready for combat
before 1945-47, and in the meanwhile the B-17 was considered inade-
quate for the Air Corps mission, “specifically in the Caribbean area.” 58
But the establishment of new bases could extend the capabilities of
existing equipment to the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power could endanger our security.
Hence the acquisition and construction of new bases became one of
the most urgent of our defense measures. This task was not, like the
development of new planes, a responsibility of the Air Corps, and
indeed some of the new bases were primarily for use of the other arms.
But the policies of the national administration enabled the AAF to
prepare its defenses in accord with its accepted doctrines.
In the Pacific, the problem was essentially one of extending facilities
in our own territories. In the Atlantic, it meant securing privileges
from other American nations or from friendly European powers. The
danger zones were obvious. In the North Atlantic, Iceland, Green-
land, and Newfoundland lay as steppingstones between Norway and
the New England-New York area. In the South Atlantic, northeast
Brazil offered a likely avenue of approach. Natal, a focal point for
established trans-Atlantic air routes, was only I ,600 nautical miles
from Africa. T o meet an invasion of this area, U.S. planes would have
to fly some 2,600 miles from Puerto Rico, the nearest U.S. territory.
Since Air Corps intelligence in the spring of 1940 wrongly credited
the Axis powers with a surplus over their European requirements of
some 4,100 planes capable of making the Africa-Natal flight,5g the
implied threat was no light one. Finally, the Caribbean constituted a
danger spot inasmuch as its eastern approaches were but poorly
fortified.
Solidarity of the nations of the Western Hemisphere was a pre-
requisite for any successful scheme of total defense in the face of the
new threats. That solidarity had been reaffirmed in the Declaration of
Lima on 24 December 1938,“ and practical measures to achieve it
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