“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
armament in his message of 28 January 1938, it was in the interests
of “national defense,” a familiar In his comparable message
of 4 January 1939, he repeated the phrase but he also pledged “our
people and our resources” to the protection of the Western Hemi-
sphere and its common ideals.46This was only a reaffirmation of the
principles of the Monroe Doctrine, but the nature of the threats
against the Americas and the means of defense were rapidly changing.
Traditionally, military threats against the hemisphere had been con-
ceived in terms of a naval attack followed by an invasion by ground
forces. Against such dangers, the U.S. Navy had generally been con-
sidered our main bulwark, and since the inception of the Monroe
Doctrine we had enjoyed the tacit support of British seapower. Only
to the archisolationist did defense mean literally the repulse of an
enemy from our own shores. In January 1938, the President stressed
the need of keeping “any potential enemy many hundred miles away
from our continental limits.” 4 7 The war in Europe did little to allay
anxieties concerning an amphibious assault in force, and by the end
of June 1940 the danger seemed acute. The Nazis had overrun Poland,
Norway, Denmark, and the Low Countries; France had collapsed and
Italy had joined her Axis partner. The British Expeditionary Force,
broken as an effective army, had barely escaped from Dunkirk, and
the Atlantic coast from Narvik to Bordeaux was in the hands of the
Germans, who seemed poised for the assault on Britain. Gone was
American skepticism over the “sitzkrieg,” and our ideological sym-
pathy toward Britain was sharpened by concern for our own security.
It required not too much imagination to envisage a complete Axis vic-
tory in Europe which would a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and, at worst, place that fleet and
the French at the disposal of the Germans. Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed upon the U.S. Navy an impossible task. That the gravity of
the situation was widely appreciated in the United States was shown
not only by the wide publicity given to the threatened realignment
of ~ e a p o w e r , ~ ~but also by the celerity with which Congress sped
through additional appropriation bills to give us a “two-ocean navy.”
But there were, as well, threats of a new sort. The war in Europe,
with its co-ordination of military and political action, its emphasis
on surprise and speed, and its concentration of power against nodal
points had indicated that aggression against the western world might
“7