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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Air power today has decided the fate of nations. Germany with her powerful
air armadas has vanquished one people after another. O n the ground, large
armies have been mobilized to resist her, but each time it was that additional
power in the air that decided the fate of each individual nation.. . . [As a con-
sequence] we are in the midst of a great crisis. T h e time factor is our principal
obstacle.43
This attitude was reflected in the sympathetic hearing accorded to
AAF problems by the highest officials of the W a r Department. In
commenting to Mr. Stimson in mid-1941 on the 500 per cent increase
in AAF tactical squadrons, General Marshall wrote: “I do not think
the public generally appreciates the vastness of the undertaking which
has been imposed upon the Air Corps in both personnel and ma-
teriel.” 44 That was almost an understatement.
T h e public could understand the announcement of a new goal for
aircraft production, for trained pilots, or for organized combat units;
rarely, one might suspect, did citizens consider the implications of
those increases in terms of their own occupations. What was required,
in civilian terms, was something like this: for a medium-sized college
to jump its graduating class from 300 to 50,000 students; for a manu-
facturer just recovering from the depression to step up his production
from 2,000 to 50,ooo items a year; for a firm doing business on a
national scale to expand its buildings and grounds by geometric rather
than arithmetic progression. All this within threc years and through
the leadership of a very limited number of trained administrators.
That progress was not smooth was all too apparent to those most in-
timately concerned-to the harried staff officer who saw each suc-
cessive program scrapped for another more difficult of attainment; to
the crew chief on the line whose team was constantly bled for cadres;
to the group commander attempting to build an effective organization
with green pilots and obsolete planes. It is little wonder that before
the period ended the war’s most expressive term-SNAFU-had been
coined. Yet for all the confusion, by 7 December 1941the AAF had
achieved a remarkable expansion, and the essential soundness of its
methods was to be manifested in its later development under war
conditions.
New Concepts of Hemisphere Defense
T h e expansion of the Army air arm which began in 1939 was mo-
tivated by considerations of hemisphere defense. T h e term was new,
the idea old. When President Roosevelt initiated the move toward re-
I 16

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.