Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Air power today has decided the fate of nations. Germany with her powerful
air armadas has vanquished one people after another. O n the ground, large
armies have been mobilized to resist her, but each time it was that additional
power in the air that decided the fate of each individual nation.. . . [As a con-
sequence] we are in the midst of a great crisis. T h e time factor is our principal
obstacle.43
This attitude was reflected in the sympathetic hearing accorded to
AAF problems by the highest officials of the W a r Department. In
commenting to Mr. Stimson in mid-1941 on the 500 per cent increase
in AAF tactical squadrons, General Marshall wrote: “I do not think
the public generally appreciates the vastness of the undertaking which
has been imposed upon the Air Corps in both personnel and ma-
teriel.” 44 That was almost an understatement.
T h e public could understand the announcement of a new goal for
aircraft production, for trained pilots, or for organized combat units;
rarely, one might suspect, did citizens consider the implications of
those increases in terms of their own occupations. What was required,
in civilian terms, was something like this: for a medium-sized college
to jump its graduating class from 300 to 50,000 students; for a manu-
facturer just recovering from the depression to step up his production
from 2,000 to 50,ooo items a year; for a firm doing business on a
national scale to expand its buildings and grounds by geometric rather
than arithmetic progression. All this within threc years and through
the leadership of a very limited number of trained administrators.
That progress was not smooth was all too apparent to those most in-
timately concerned-to the harried staff officer who saw each suc-
cessive program scrapped for another more difficult of attainment; to
the crew chief on the line whose team was constantly bled for cadres;
to the group commander attempting to build an effective organization
with green pilots and obsolete planes. It is little wonder that before
the period ended the war’s most expressive term-SNAFU-had been
coined. Yet for all the confusion, by 7 December 1941the AAF had
achieved a remarkable expansion, and the essential soundness of its
methods was to be manifested in its later development under war
conditions.
New Concepts of Hemisphere Defense
T h e expansion of the Army air arm which began in 1939 was mo-
tivated by considerations of hemisphere defense. T h e term was new,
the idea old. When President Roosevelt initiated the move toward re-
I 16

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.