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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
not a fit substitute for unity of command. In March, Secretary of
W a r Henry L. Stimson directed that action be taken to place the air
arm under a single commander. Shortly thereafter, the office of As-
sistant Secretary of W a r for Air was revived with Robert A. Lovett,
who since December had served as special assistant on air matters,
as the first incumbent. His able energies were directed to two major
tasks: promotion of aircraft production and streamlining the organiza-
tion of the Army air arm.39 T h e resulting reorganization, which be-
came effective on 2 0 June 1941,created the Army Air Forces. T h e
AAF was superior to the Air Corps and to the Air Force Combat
Command (AFCC), the agency replacing the GHQ Air
General Arnold, as Chief of the Army Air Forces, was made directly
responsible to the Army Chief of Staff and was given the responsibility
for establishing policies and plans for all Army aviation activities. In
accordance with a W a r Department policy toward decentralization
of staff work, the Chief of the AAF was provided with an air staff to
assist in formulating policy. General Arnold also retained his position
of Deputy Chief of Staff, thus serving as the principal contact be-
tween the AAF and the W a r Department General Staff. Under Gen-
eral Arnold's jurisdiction, the new Chief of the Air Corps, Maj. Gen.
George H. Brett, and the commanding general of the Air Force Com-
bat Command, Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, were made responsible
for service and combat functions, re~pectively.~'
T h e reorganization of June 1941marked a notable gain for the air
arm, yet in actual practice a number of defects soon appeared. T h e
line of responsibilities between service and combat elements was not
distinctly drawn, nor were relationships between the AAF and the
War Department clearly defined. Both the AAF and the W a r Depart-
ment continued to study the possibilities of further improvements.
On the eve of war it had become clear that the most successful solu-
tion would involve a radical reorganization of the military establish-
ment, with the AAF enjoying virtual autonomy within the W a r
Department. Such a change was to come early in the war.42
T h e trend toward autonomy, like the appropriations and authoriza-
tions for expansion, was symptomatic of the growing official recog-
nition of the decisive importance of air power in national defense.
Secretary of W a r Stimson, testifying before a joint congressional
committee in August 1940, gave expression to the new attitude:
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.