“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
not a fit substitute for unity of command. In March, Secretary of
W a r Henry L. Stimson directed that action be taken to place the air
arm under a single commander. Shortly thereafter, the office of As-
sistant Secretary of W a r for Air was revived with Robert A. Lovett,
who since December had served as special assistant on air matters,
as the first incumbent. His able energies were directed to two major
tasks: promotion of aircraft production and streamlining the organiza-
tion of the Army air arm.39 T h e resulting reorganization, which be-
came effective on 2 0 June 1941,created the Army Air Forces. T h e
AAF was superior to the Air Corps and to the Air Force Combat
Command (AFCC), the agency replacing the GHQ Air
General Arnold, as Chief of the Army Air Forces, was made directly
responsible to the Army Chief of Staff and was given the responsibility
for establishing policies and plans for all Army aviation activities. In
accordance with a W a r Department policy toward decentralization
of staff work, the Chief of the AAF was provided with an air staff to
assist in formulating policy. General Arnold also retained his position
of Deputy Chief of Staff, thus serving as the principal contact be-
tween the AAF and the W a r Department General Staff. Under Gen-
eral Arnold's jurisdiction, the new Chief of the Air Corps, Maj. Gen.
George H. Brett, and the commanding general of the Air Force Com-
bat Command, Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, were made responsible
for service and combat functions, re~pectively.~'
T h e reorganization of June 1941marked a notable gain for the air
arm, yet in actual practice a number of defects soon appeared. T h e
line of responsibilities between service and combat elements was not
distinctly drawn, nor were relationships between the AAF and the
War Department clearly defined. Both the AAF and the W a r Depart-
ment continued to study the possibilities of further improvements.
On the eve of war it had become clear that the most successful solu-
tion would involve a radical reorganization of the military establish-
ment, with the AAF enjoying virtual autonomy within the W a r
Department. Such a change was to come early in the war.42
T h e trend toward autonomy, like the appropriations and authoriza-
tions for expansion, was symptomatic of the growing official recog-
nition of the decisive importance of air power in national defense.
Secretary of W a r Stimson, testifying before a joint congressional
committee in August 1940, gave expression to the new attitude:
" 5