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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
by that act was too short a period to justify any extended technical
training3
Civilian instructional facilities did not, of course, satisfy all the
needs of the Air Corps. Additional schools and readjustments in exist-
ing arrangements were provided under the general expansion program.
Training for individual flying specialties, which had been conducted
under the Air Corps Training Center at Randolph Field, Texas, was
expanded in July 1940 and placed under the direction of three flying
training “centers,” spaced geographically in areas enjoying the best
flying weather and each including a number, steadily growing, of
basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train-
ing was vested in the GHQ Air Force and after June 1941 in its suc-
cessor, the Air Force Combat Command. The Technical Training
Command, with responsibility for all individual technical instruction,
was established in March 1941.’~
In all phases of the training program, courses of study were com-
pressed and pared down to the essentials. Curricula were made as
pragmatic as possible; there was no time for theoretical frills. In train-
ing, as in the development of aircraft, efforts were made to incor-
porate tactical lessons of the air war in Europe, which emphasized the
importance of formation flying at all altitudes, of accuracy in bomb-
ing and gunnery, and of the development of well-integrated combat
crews.36If in these respects the green crews of the early months of
the war did not always appear proficient, it was not for lack of ap-
preciation of the importance of this sort of training. Rather it
stemmed again from the lack of time, the shortage of instructors and
equipment-especially of planes. The shortage of trainers, acute at first,
was gradually overcome as factories concentrated first on their pro-
duction; but the very serious dearth of combat planes, in which alone
successful unit training could be carried out, lasted until long after
we were at war. Lacking equipment, the schools improvised; lacking
time, some adopted a 24-hour working day and a 7-day week. It was
not the sort of school life which would draw the nostalgic alumnus
back for a twenty-fifth reunion. But it got results.
The expansion of the Air Corps in materiel and in personnel re-
quired a comparable growth in its physical plant; new airfields were
needed for the training program, new depots for maintenance and
supply of the increasing number of planes, new bases for the tactical
units responsible for national defense. This aspect of expansion, like
I I2

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.