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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
P-38 and P-47 were not to get into action until summer of 1942 and
spring of 1943, respectively. The listed planes were the ones, however,
with which we were to fight the first two years of the war. The only
important new-type aircraft were to come in late 1943 or 1944-the
P-51, first produced in quantity for the British, the A-36, the P-61,
the A-26, and the B-29. Of the models actually in use before Pearl
Harbor, tests and combat records seemed to indicate that as com-
pared to like foreign types, our heavy bombers were superior to our
medium and light bombers, while our light bombers were superior
to our fighters. In general those judgments were borne out by later
experience, though each of the planes underwent repeated improve-
ments on the basis of combat experience.
Personnel requirements grew with the increase in authorization for
aircraft. Intensive recruiting campaigns brought an influx of men as
permitted under the higher ceiling set by Congress in 1939. In mid-
1940, the Air Corps was authorized to procure flying cadets and
Reserve officers without limit during the fiscal year 1941, and relaxed
entrance requirements for cadets made possible the appointment of
large numbers for flying training. The President's order in August
1940 2 6 calling up the National Guard and Reserve forces resulted in
further increases in personnel. A still greater impetus to Air Corps
enlistment, from autumn 1940 until Pearl Harbor, came from the
Selective Service System program; even though procurement of pilots,
aircrew members, and technicians was still on a volunteer basis, the
prospect of compulsory service in an undesignated branch of the
Army proved a potent spur to Air Corps enlistment. Under these vari-
ous stimuli, the total number of Air Corps personnel jumped from
20,503 on I July 1939 to 152,569 just two years later, and the rate
of expansion was rapidly increasing when the United States went to
war.27
Pilot training goals were successively raised to keep pace with the
anticipated progress of other defense programs. From an objective
in 1939 calling for the training of 1 , 2 0 0 pilots a year, the figure was
raised in 1940 to 7,000, then to IZ,OOO, and by directive of February
1941 to 30,000. By the fall of that year, when the 84-group program
was under discussion, the AAF contemplated a training rate of 50,000
pilots a year by mid-1942.'~These goals called also for the training of
a proportionate number of other aircrew members and ground tech-
nicians. The Air Corps had neither the instructors nor facilities for
I I 0

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.