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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 gains, both in planes manufactured and in the rate of acceleration, came in the latter half of the year, when the fall of France and the Battle of Britain lent a grim incentive to American efforts. By the end of September 1940, contracts were outstanding for 16,649 Army air- craft, of which 9,122 were ta~tica1.l~In the second half of that year, 3,770 military aircraft were accepted by all users; in 1941,the total accepted was 19,428. Nor do these figures reveal the whole story; there was, because of a trend toward heavy bomber types, a marked increase in the average weight per plane as well as a numerical gain.20 Of the aircraft delivered the Air Corps received far too few to equip its authorized fifty-four groups. Prospects for the future were, how- ever, encouraging. The appropriations of 1939 and 1940were dwarfed by those of the following year. In the first eight months of 1941,some $6,500,000,000was appropriated, the major part of which was allo- cated to the procurement of about I 5,000 aircraft and the enlargement of productive capacity. All told, the Air Corps was authorized, in the three years before Pearl Harbor, to expend about eight billion dollars and to procure about 37,500 planes.’l It had not known such generosity since I 9 I 7, One policy of the Air Corps ran counter to the insistence on mass production of existing models of aircraft. This was the continued stress on research and development. Efforts to develop new types of air- craft diverted talent from tasks of current utility to projects which, if successful, might pay dividends in the future. The policy was costly, but in view of the time lag between original design and quantity pro- duction, it was essential if we were to keep abreast of German devel- opments. The results of the research and development program were not always spectacular. Many new airplane models were stillborn, or died in the experimental stage. But the same program which spawned such forgotten airplanes as the XP-44 or the XB-21 gave birth also to the B-29, designed in 1940. Mass production was hampered even more by the large number of modifications for current models which this policy encouraged. Changes in design and equipment made standardization difficult; “freezing” a model at a certain stage in its development would have made for more rapid production. But to keep abreast of foreign air forces, it was necessary to incorporate h- provements which were constantly suggested by combat experience. The earliest and most obvious lesson which came from the air war in Europe was the need for heavier armor, greater defensive firepower, I 08
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