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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
tion goals, of training schedules, and of provisions for new air instal-
lations. T h e constant modification of plans was not conducive to
steady development; but neither, for that matter, were the dispatches
from Europe. Under the impact of each new threat from abroad the
President called for new defense appropriations and set new produc-
tion goals. Congress readily made available the funds requested and
authorized the expansion recommended. But one item-time-not even
a generous Congress could grant. Hence the whole story of Air Corps
activity in the period 1939-41may be conceived as a race against time
in a desperate effort to overtake Axis air forces which had long been
on a war basis. T o make the most of the time available, the Air Corps
scrapped or revised many procedures of long standing; “judicious
shortcuts,” to use an Army locution, became the order of the day in
procurement of materiel, in training, and in the development of air
installations. Undoubtedly the emphasis on speed and quantity in all
phases of expansion often led to a lowering of peacetime standards of
acceptance; but this tendency was not carried to dangerous extremes
and qualitative losses were more than offset by quantitative gains. T h e
process, in short, was typical of American mass production, with all
the merits and the flaws of that system.
T h e aspect of expansion which was most eagerly followed by the
American public was the rapid growth in the output of military air-
craft. T h e seemingly miraculous accomplishments in this respect were
essentially civilian rather than military. They were made possible
through the fortunate combination of a highly adaptable industry,
great national resources, and generous government aid; but the Air
Corps played here a significant, if lesser, part. Contracts in 1939 were
awarded on the basis of single-shift production, but factories moved
steadily into a two-, then a three-shift schedule as more trained per-
sonnel became available.’5 T h e Air Corps, along with the Office of
Production Management, adopted various methods of acquainting
manufacturers with new types of aeronautical equipment, of spread-
ing production among more firms, and of increasing the capacity of
the industry. “Educational orders” were placed with manufacturers,
existing facilities were enlarged by the aid of government financing,
and new plants were built by the government for operation by private
firms. “Letter contracts” saved from one to three months in initiating
the fabrication of aircraft by permitting manufacturers to purchase
materials before a formal contract could be drawn up and signed.
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.