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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
tion goals, of training schedules, and of provisions for new air instal-
lations. T h e constant modification of plans was not conducive to
steady development; but neither, for that matter, were the dispatches
from Europe. Under the impact of each new threat from abroad the
President called for new defense appropriations and set new produc-
tion goals. Congress readily made available the funds requested and
authorized the expansion recommended. But one item-time-not even
a generous Congress could grant. Hence the whole story of Air Corps
activity in the period 1939-41may be conceived as a race against time
in a desperate effort to overtake Axis air forces which had long been
on a war basis. T o make the most of the time available, the Air Corps
scrapped or revised many procedures of long standing; “judicious
shortcuts,” to use an Army locution, became the order of the day in
procurement of materiel, in training, and in the development of air
installations. Undoubtedly the emphasis on speed and quantity in all
phases of expansion often led to a lowering of peacetime standards of
acceptance; but this tendency was not carried to dangerous extremes
and qualitative losses were more than offset by quantitative gains. T h e
process, in short, was typical of American mass production, with all
the merits and the flaws of that system.
T h e aspect of expansion which was most eagerly followed by the
American public was the rapid growth in the output of military air-
craft. T h e seemingly miraculous accomplishments in this respect were
essentially civilian rather than military. They were made possible
through the fortunate combination of a highly adaptable industry,
great national resources, and generous government aid; but the Air
Corps played here a significant, if lesser, part. Contracts in 1939 were
awarded on the basis of single-shift production, but factories moved
steadily into a two-, then a three-shift schedule as more trained per-
sonnel became available.’5 T h e Air Corps, along with the Office of
Production Management, adopted various methods of acquainting
manufacturers with new types of aeronautical equipment, of spread-
ing production among more firms, and of increasing the capacity of
the industry. “Educational orders” were placed with manufacturers,
existing facilities were enlarged by the aid of government financing,
and new plants were built by the government for operation by private
firms. “Letter contracts” saved from one to three months in initiating
the fabrication of aircraft by permitting manufacturers to purchase
materials before a formal contract could be drawn up and signed.
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.