The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
irfields and bases had to be acquired and built. Orderly expansion
demanded that these three tasks be accomplished according to a bal-
anced plan and at a synchronized rate; a lag or overdevelopment in
any phase would delay or disrupt the program. Had expansion been
carried only to the goal anticipated in the authorizations of early 1939,
its prompt fulfilment would have been difficult; but under the impact
of ever darker threats from abroad, the Air Corps was faced time and
again with the need of increasing its estimates.
Since the mission of the Air Corps was the preparation of units or-
ganized, trained, and equipped for combat, the guiding factor in its
efforts a t systematic expansion consisted of a series of programs for
the creation of a balanced air force of fully prepared combat groups.
T o take advantage of approved increases in aircraft and personnel,
the Air Corps in the spring of 1939 formulated a plan calling for 24
tactical groups to be combat-ready by 30 June 1 9 4 1 . ~ "Long before
this objective was reached, however, the trend of events abroad urged
further expansion, and in May 1940 the Air Corps projected the 41-
group program." Within two months the goal was again revised up-
ward in the 54-group program, which would provide an air force of
4,000 tactical planes, I 87,000 enlisted men, I 5,000 aviation cadets, and
16,800 officers.'* In autumn of 1941, the Army Air Forces, in anticipa-
tion of the vast expansion contemplated in the as yet unapproved
Victory Program for munitions, formulated the 84-group program,
which would enlarge the force to a personnel strength of 400,000 by
3 0 June 194z.l~Little was done before Pearl Harbor to implement
this more ambitious schedule. By 7 December, a total of seventy
tactical groups had been activated, including fourteen heavy bombard-
ment, nine medium bombardment, five light bombardment, twenty-
five pursuit, eleven observation, and six transport groups.14 But many
of the units were at cadre strength only, and few had been equipped
with suitable aircraft. Actually the 54-group program, which came
to be known as the First Aviation Objective, was the most realistic
of the prewar plans; but its full achievement was impossible as long
as the American aircraft industry was unable to keep pace with
British and American demands.
T h e pattern of prewar expansion of the Air Corps was then one of
repeated upward revision of goals, with each new objective rendered
obsolete long before it had been realized. This was characteristic of
the programs for combat units; it was equally true of airplane produc-
' 0 5