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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
other headquarters, and this was especially true of the overseas organi-
zations, where the chain of command normally ran from the command-
ing general of the local air force through theater headquarters to the
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. The Historical Office could use its influ-
ence to secure from the War Department authorization of vacancies
for the job in tables of organization, it could offer its assistance in the
procurement of qualified personnel for the vacancies so established,
and it could make suggestions regarding desirable objectives and
standards. But the final choice remained with the commanding general,
who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash-
ington to provide his own historical officer, and who in other instances
elected to fill the vacancies established by selection from his own staff.
In most cases, however, the offer of professional assistance from AAF
Headquarters was welcomed, though occasionally the official request
for such aid came late. The first historians selected by the Historical
Office for overseas service reached their stations only in late 1943, and
with most of them the time of arrival fell in 1944. Within the Zone of
the Interior, where the chain of command ran down from General
Arnold, the establishment of historical sections had proved to be a
less time-consuming effort. Even so, there were limits arising from the
old and generally sound principle of command that a superior gives
his subordinate a job to do but leaves it to him in large part to deter-
mine how best it can be done.
The finding of available personnel possessed of the desired qualifi-
cations was still another matter. Though civilians were heavily relied
upon in the Historical Office and at points elsewhere *inthe Zone of
the Interior, most of the key assignments required use of military
personnel. Opportunities for commissioning historians direct from
civilian life being limited and a t an early date entirely eliminated, it
was necessary to rely upon qualified personnel already in the Army;
and, since other branches had use for their own historians, the choice
actually came to be limited to the rosters of the AAF. Fortunately, a
considerable number of men possessed of advanced training in history
or closely related fields had volunteered at an early stage of the war
effort for service with the Army Air Forces, and they had played an
especially significant part in the development of the AAF training
program. As that program passed its peak in 1943, an increasing num-
ber of those men became available for reassignment to the historical
program. Being of military age, they were for the most part young
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.