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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 habit in respect to war had ever been first declare, then prepare. That this policy had enjoyed the apparent sanction of success was not be- cause of any virtue inherent in it. Actually our victories in foreign wars owed much to three factors: the weakness of enemies like Mexico and Spain; the involvement of enemies like England and Germany with other European powers; and the geographical isolation of our nation. In the period 1939-41these factors obtained, if at all, in a lesser degree. Our potential enemies were strong, not weak; they were girded for war materially and spiritually. The friendly powers upon whom we might have depended for respite long shrank from war, and when war came they crumbled one by one until only Britain stood, and that precariously. And new techniques of war and new weapons- particularly the long-range bomber and the carrier-borne plane-had weakened the security once offered by our geographical situation. Given these changed conditions and the revolutionary doctrines and aggressive activities of the Axis powers, the United States could ill afford its customary delay in preparing for war. The national administration appreciated the new threat to our security earlier than did most American citizens, but before Pearl Harbor the public had, for the most part, come to recognize that threat. This change in public opinion was in reality a psychological preparation for war; it was brought about by the sheer logic of events abroad and by the activities of private citizens, acting individually or through organized groups, as well as by the educational efforts of the national admini~tration.~Perhaps in the last analysis the psychological preparation was the most important single factor in improving our national defense, but this chapter is concerned only with more tangi- ble measures inaugurated by the government. When war broke out in Europe in September 1939, the United States declared its n e ~ t r a l i t y . ~Its stated policy was to remain out of the conflict if possible and a t the same time to keep the totalitarian powers out of the Western Hemisphere. The latter objective de- manded a further extension and an acceleration of previous programs for strengthening American armed forces. It called also, because of the threat of new weapons and modes of warfare, for the establish- ment of new strategic bases. The declared policy was wholly con- sonant with the Monroe Doctrine, and the measures taken to enforce it were, for a while, consistent with our traditional ideas of defense. But under the impact of repeated Axis successes in Europe, the I02
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