“United Press”36 pages
- p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8
LONDON
The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada
Copyright 1948 by…
- p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary
judgment of the importance of this…
- p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani-
zation and, by default, leadership…
- p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing
for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
- p. 61 …It held that
there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
- p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures,
and Howell’s group…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States
and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
- p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could
be concentrated on either coast…
- p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval
air units, while the army attempted to…
- p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train-
ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
- p. 164 …A m y air units in the
Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
- p. 176 …no military alliances
were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans
only…
- p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy
bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
- p. 285 …From 1938 the United
States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
- p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and
lmmediate Deployment
On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
- p. 289 …ground units sent
in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major
invasion of…
- p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States.
Capture of…
- p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them-
selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
- p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart-
ment again pressed for an answer…
- p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle
East Air Force and later as…
- p. 430 …Attempts had been
made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United
States, but…
- p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no
opportunity to get set. The…
- p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters
already included many representatives of the…
- p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the
Netherlands East Indies, he was…
- p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved
that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed
trucks…
- p. 563 …Grady arrived from the
United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with
reference to…
- p. 564 …TO C H I N A
graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to
make high…
- p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became
almost a t once…
- p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate
offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily
against…
- p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air
units initially based there were to…
- p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United
Kingdom several months…
- p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with
its own under a plan eventually…
- p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was
(Patrick, United States in the Air, pp.
190-91.)
38. Charges of…
- p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941.
9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a.
92…
- p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45
Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
C H A P T E R 4
* * * * * * * * * * *
T H E AIR CORPS
PREPARES FOR WAR, 1939-4I
N 28 January 1938 President Roosevelt declared our national
defenses inadequate in the face of warlike preparations
0 abroad which constituted “a threat to world peace and
security.” H e then asked for appropriations, largely naval, to im-
prove our defenses. The itemized list of requirements included a sum
for antiaircraft materiel but not for aircraft. A year later, with conflict
threatening in Europe and an undeclared war raging in Asia, the Presi-
dent asked for a much larger sum with which to strengthen our mili-
tary establishment. This time Air Corps requirements accounted for
more than half the total requests.2
These appropriations marked the beginning of a radical change in
our foreign policy. In the decade after World War I, repudiating the
League of Nations, we had based our hopes of security on the out-
lawry of war, on international disarmament, and on our geographical
isolation. In the mid-thirties, as other great powers began to rearm,
we had sought further to insulate ourselves against foreign wars by
enacting neutrality legislation, which in effect abrogated our tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the right to distinguish morally between aggressor nations and
their victims. But by the beginning of 1939 we had turned to rearma-
ment, and before the year had run out we had begun to scrap the
neutrality restrictions. For three years before the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor we were preparing, by these and other measures, for a
war which we did not want but which many had come to feel was
inescapable if we were to maintain our traditional way of life.
This preparation was without precedent in our national history, un-
less an exception be claimed for the very limited efforts of I 9 I 6- I 7. Our
I 0 1